

Current History

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Current History

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What are the problems facing Canada in the next decade? What will be the nature of her relations with the United States and the rest of the world? How will her own internal problems affect these relationships? In this issue, seven articles discuss Canada's strengths and weaknesses. Our introductory article examines the history of United States-Canadian relations, and concludes that "in part it is the very closeness of the Canadian-American relationship that makes it unique. It is made up of many parts: economic and geographic, political and strategic, cultural and psychic. Most light can be cast on the overall phenomenon by looking individually at its parts."

Canadian-American Relations in Perspective

BY CRAUFURD D. GOODWIN
Program Officer, Ford Foundation

CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS have been discussed with numbing frequency over the past century. During much of the period the tone and content of the discussions have reflected the state of the relations: tentative and immature.¹ Discussants have been mainly internationalist Canadians or Americans of Canadian origin, and their contributions have had a distinct Pollyanna quality. They have noted the natural identity of interest between the two nations, the common Anglo-Saxon heritage, and the glorious opportunities for cooperative endeavor. They have explained the relationship by means of a wide variety of metaphors: mother and child (of divorced parents!), big brother and little sister (including Siamese twins), the Federal Union and the American South, elephant and mouse, and even Goliath and David. Until recently, few of the discussions included either "real" Americans with no ties of blood, trade or politics to Canada, or disgruntled Canadians willing to examine publicly critical problems in the relationship with a deeply skeptical eye. By and large the converted lectured to the saved.

¹ An important exception is the volume edited for the American Assembly by John Sloan Dickey, *The United States and Canada* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964).

Then, in the late 1960's, some new discordant sounds began to appear in discussions of Canadian-American relations. Shrill notes of anger and strident nationalism (with accompanying anti-Americanism) were heard among the Canadians, matched by moans of self-doubt and self-abnegation among the Americans. Instead of interpreting this cacophony as the trump of doom for good relations between the two countries, it can be heard as hopeful modern music indicating that the two neighbors have reached a new level of maturity. It can be argued that for the first time in a century relations between the United States and Canada have been approached as links between two autonomous nations with different interests and of unequal power, but of equal and unquestioned sovereignty.

Canadian-American relations are far too complex to understand either as a single phenomenon or through reference merely to a convenient analogy. Similar bilateral relationships between, say, Finland and Russia, Luxembourg and France, or even the United States and Mexico have some parallels, but they have even more differences. In part it is the very closeness of the Canadian-American relationship that makes it unique. It is made up of many factors: economic and geographic, political and strategic, cul-

tural and psychic. Most light can be cast on the overall phenomenon by looking individually at its parts.

I

The geographical inequality of Canada and the United States and of their border has been a determining factor in their relationship. Despite a land mass in excess of the United States, Canada contains only about one-tenth of the American population and no larger a proportion of arable land, the barest fringe of North American settlement mostly within 50 miles of the border. Energetic efforts have failed to alter the geographic distribution of population in Canada, and the result has been that most Canadians remain perpetually in the United States dooryard while most Americans, preferring more salubrious southern regions, are barely conscious of the Canadian presence at all. A complicating element in Canadian settlement is the fragmentation of the ribbon of population into at least five regions segmented and partly isolated by rivers, mountains, and relatively barren wastes. According to geography alone each of the Canadian regions should have more in common with neighbors to the south than with their countrymen to the east and west.

Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the British North American colonies which became Canada in 1867 continued to be natural economic competitors of the United States to the south. Like the Americans, the Canadians exported fish, fur, timber and grain to Europe in return for manufactured goods, immigrants and capital. But during the second half of the nineteenth century a pervasive economic continentalism began to draw Canada ever more tightly within a North American market economy and away from Britain. Canals, railways and even confederation were aimed at resisting this force, but it was like Canute arresting the tide. In fact, settlement of the Canadian west was simply the natural outward movement of the overall North American frontier; mineral exploration came in response to demands from the south; and much of Canadian manufacturing developed in American branch plants. By pursuing their particular comparative advantages within the broader North American context, Canadians came to enjoy a standard of living only slightly below that of their southern neighbors, but the price they paid was integration within a wider continental economic system.

For a while after Canada's weaning away from British markets began, hopes rose for the creation of a new and balanced triangular trading relationship involving the United States. However, this hope soon became only a dream. Nevertheless Canada's economic assimilation with the United States was neither uninterrupted nor tranquil. While informal market

relationships became ever closer and bi-national division of labor increased, formal attempts to recognize and strengthen the development met only mixed success. The first obstacle to full assimilation was deep suspicion among some Canadians that economic integration beyond a certain point would be incompatible with political sovereignty. Could the Canadian component of the greater North American economy, they asked, ever be unlike a bowl of Mrs. Murphy's famous rabbit stew in which the ingredients would be one Canadian rabbit and one American horse? The second obstacle was an intermittently cavalier attitude among American national leaders toward the integrative process. Usually Americans favored closer ties, but they also hesitated not at all to reverse their position when domestic politics or other considerations so dictated.

The historical developments have even exhibited cyclical characteristics. Repeatedly, Canadian and American continentalists have either proposed or forged closer trading links, only to have them rejected or severed by a combination of nationalist feelings in Canada and insensitivity in the United States. Moves toward closer relations ended with lapses back toward separation after the abortive annexation movement of 1849, the reciprocity period of 1854-1866, the move for renewed reciprocity in the 1870's, the Commercial Union scheme of the 1880's, the plan for reciprocity once again in 1911, and the efforts to fight the depression of the 1930's including the Smoot-Hawley tariff and the Ottawa agreements.

TRADE RELATIONS

The years since World War II have been inconclusive in the development of Canadian-American trade relations. Trading volumes in both directions increased to more than ten billion dollars by 1970, keeping the countries still the main trading partners of each other; yet no new broad-based bilateral devices such as a customs union have been introduced to facilitate the flows. Both countries participated in the multilateral negotiations for trade reductions through GATT, and they agreed to a landmark provision for free trade in automobiles and parts among manufacturers. However, there were also some backward steps. In particular, the United States tariff surcharge of August 15, 1971, promised serious hardship to the Canadian economy and mobilized Canadian public opinion in a defensive manner reminiscent of the "spirit of 1866" which had led to Canadian Confederation and the protectionist "National Policy" of 1879. At the present time, negotiations for renewal of the "Autopact" still feel reverberations from the surcharge.

A change in trading conditions since World War II which may have forever interrupted the cyclical pattern of economic relations between the two countries

is the growing dependence of the American economy upon certain key Canadian resources. Whereas in earlier years trade depended heavily on differing comparative advantages between the two nations in the production of a range of goods from farm, forest and factory, recently trade has included items which are of more fundamental importance to the United States, including petroleum products, iron ore, electric power and even fresh water. The essence of the change is that Canada's commercial bargaining power may be undergoing a modification in kind rather than of degree. If American dependence continues to grow in this way, cyclical fluctuations in relations may become out of the question. If, for example, the United States should decide again suddenly to impose tariff barriers of the Smoot-Hawley (1931) type, or even of the surcharge (1971) variety, Canada may have the capacity literally as well as figuratively to cut off her water. Such a circumstance might signal the point beyond which description of trading links between Canada and the United States as conventional "international relations" come to have doubtful meaning.

The economic relationship with the United States which has disturbed Canadians most in recent years has been not trade but investment. Few Canadians seriously contemplate Canadian commercial autarky, but many are deeply concerned about the degree of foreign ownership of their capital goods. Unfortunately, discussion of this question has been clouded more by rhetoric than it has been illuminated by dispassionate analysis. Removal of American control over Canadian industry has become a rallying cry in Canada, somewhat like "no Popery" in Northern Ireland and anti-communism in the United States. Emotion counts for more than reason, and the issue serves as a means of attacking more than just the issue in question. In Canada, verbal assaults on the behavior of American investment have been used by some to camouflage denunciations of the whole institution of private capital and by others as a convenient scapegoat for a wide variety of complex problems whose causes might prove elusive or embarrassing.

Despite evidence that the proportion of Canadian business assets owned by all foreigners in Canada remained roughly unchanged during the 1960's at about one quarter of the total, public outcry about the situation grew dramatically during the decade. Superficial and selective reporting of events may have contributed to this result, including lurid accounts of American takeovers combined with neglect of corporate repatriations, Canadian takeovers in the United States, and discussion of Canadian industries where the proportion of foreign ownership is low.² A subtle

element in Canadian views of American investment is that the resentment reflects not only nationalism but also the suspicion of the provinces toward the metropolis. The image of head-office domination from Chicago and New York as seen in Regina and Toronto is not very different from the way it is seen in Des Moines and Atlanta.

There is no reason, of course, why Canadians cannot and should not legislate as they see fit to exclude, limit, control or direct foreign capital in their own economy. The danger is that they will do this thoughtlessly and without either a careful assessment of aggregate costs and benefits or a survey of alternative courses of action. There is always the temptation to behave unfairly toward foreign devils, without remembering in this case that American capital came to Canada not with gunboats or conspiracy but on invitation and with the welcome of Canadian leaders. On the American side, there is today perhaps as much sensitivity toward foreign treatment of investment abroad as there is to any international economic issue, and the possibility of reciprocal punitive actions over the capital question is perhaps the darkest cloud that hangs over Canadian-American relations.

II

Politically, Canada's main problem has been from the very beginning to establish a national identity which other countries and her own citizens could take seriously. Canada achieved nationhood without any cataclysmic events like war or rebellion to weld the people together. Canada was the product, instead, of the first wave of voluntary decolonization in the dissolution of the British Empire—a process which produced few heroes or dramatic moments. Nor has any upheaval comparable, say, to the American Civil War occurred; nor has a great world mission for Canada come to light. Sacrificial participation in two world wars helped to some extent to perfect Canada's image abroad, but divisive internal conflict over military conscription more than counterbalanced any overall benefit to nationhood.

Canada's difficulty is not only that her prosaic origins robbed her of unifying memories and rallying cries; these origins also gave others few reasons to notice her presence. In the shade of her large and glamorous neighbor, Canada has seemed smaller than life. To most Americans, Canadians have always been there: polite, looking and sounding slightly British or French, and remarkably well behaved in a world where most foreigners are quarrelsome, unpredictable and ungrateful. Even today, few Americans can recount any event in Canadian history, with the possible exception of Expo '67, let alone give the year of Confederation or name the ten provinces. In fact, many Americans still think Canada is a possession of the United Kingdom, and some of the most embar-

² For a full discussion of this issue see particularly, A. E. Safarian, "Some Myths about Foreign Investment in Canada," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, August, 1971, pp. 3-21.

rassing moments in political relations have occurred when well intentioned and generous American statesmen have offered to purchase more of the northern landscape in the same way that they acquired Alaska.

It is not that Americans have often intended consciously to offend Canadian national pride; it is simply that in the United States there seem to be so many other more important things to do than think deeply about Canadian affairs. On the question of a possible political union between the two countries, Americans have been insensitive to Canadian feelings because until very recently they could not conceive of such a proposition being anything but attractive and a high compliment to the other party. In Canada, on the other hand, sensitivity to American slights has always been intense, and insults, real or imagined, are seized, remembered and magnified over time. Irritants range from the order in which the President holds summit meetings to suggestions that Alaskan oil be transported over Canadian tundra.

A crucial determinant of Canadian-American political relations has always been the way in which the United States views the wider world. Up until World War II, a main characteristic of American foreign policy seemed to be self-confident expansionism in the western hemisphere, and after World War II it was leadership of the free world in a cold war against communism. In both periods, in American eyes, Canada had clear-cut roles to play. In the first instance, she was expected gradually to relinquish her ties with Britain and prepare for merger at the appropriate time in a greater American commonwealth. Canada was like a fruit ripening on the British tree, to use Secretary William H. Seward's unfortunate phrase. In the second period, at least until the mid-1960's, she was expected to join obediently in the fight against Communist evil, placing embargoes on the products of enemy countries on demand, providing bases for American missiles and men, and generally integrating her own small defense forces within the continental whole.

NEW AMERICAN PROBLEMS

The Vietnam war and internal racial conflict have had profound effects upon the American world view and, as a result, upon relations with Canada. Of great significance, American self-confidence in the 1960's suffered some of the cruelest blows in its history. The average American could not view the rest of the world with benign condescension while abroad his country's policies were rejected by more and more nations and at home his statesmen met assassins' bullets and his cities faced riot and the torch. What is more, the American moral position was challenged from within and without as never before. The nation was accused, particularly by its own young, of racism, imperialism and hypocrisy. For the first time since

the Civil War, American youth by the thousands refused to serve in the armed forces and found refuge in countries abroad, including Canada.

A variety of effects of a new and more humble United States world view, which is still evolving at this time, may have significant implications for relations with Canada. First, growing American doubts about the wisdom of trying to remain the world's policeman, or even its doctor, have already been reflected in sharply reduced United States foreign aid and proposals to limit troop strength abroad. Re-evaluation of the bold commitment to take responsibility in the four corners of the earth must lead the United States to pay more attention to her neighbors and herself. One manifestation of a new looking inward is the movement for environmental protection, a field in which Canada must play a large part.

An important result for Canada may flow from experience with the civil rights movement with its recognition that numerous racial, ethnic and linguistic elements in the American population have enduring value and the right to survive. American society, this movement taught, should be thought of as a smorgasbord rather than as a melting pot, and German, Polish, and even French Canadian groups as well as black and Mexican Americans should be encouraged to sustain and develop their cultural heritages. To the movement for the preservation of national diversity Canada can make direct contributions on behalf of the millions of emigrants it has sent south over the years; she has also had a century of experience in building a multi-cultural and multi-lingual society.

The changing world view of the United States has also affected the evolution of Canada's own perception of her international role. Prior to World War II, this role consisted mainly of holding off more or less belligerent exercises in pursuit of America's manifest destiny. At times the threat was genuinely serious, as in the years immediately after the Civil War, but for most of the time it was comparable to resisting the advances of a rich, well-meaning, clumsy and demanding suitor—a nerve-racking experience but hardly a dangerous one. Complex treaties over such issues as fisheries, boundaries and armaments, together with the establishment of a Joint Canadian-American Commission, helped ease the tension.

(Continued on page 216)

Craufurd Goodwin is Program Officer in Charge of European and International Affairs at the Ford Foundation, on leave from Duke University, where he is Professor of Economics. He is the author of *Canadian Economic Thought* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1961), *Economic Enquiry in Australia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966), and other books and articles. He is also editor of the journal *History of Political Economy*.

"The Canadian political system may be moving toward greater economic and political independence with regard to the United States and toward a reassessment of the desirability of American penetration of the economy and polity. But this is not to say that Canada's leaders are unaware, almost painfully so, of the parameters which circumscribe their possible courses of action."

At the Interface: Canada and the United States in the Seventies

BY CHRISTIAN P. POTHOLM

Assistant Professor of Government, Bowdoin College

IT HAS BEEN MORE THAN SIXTEEN YEARS since this journal devoted an entire issue to the study of Canada. During the period under review, a great deal has happened which has deeply influenced the course of American-Canadian relations and has called into question some of the basic assumptions about their interaction. Curiously enough, these changes have simultaneously underscored both the economic interdependence of the two nations, and an increasing trend toward divergence with regard to national goals.

Nowhere in the spectrum of issues facing Canada and the United States is a basic shift in attitudes seen more clearly than in the area of common defense policy. During the 1950's and the height of the cold war, the leaders of Canada asserted, and much of her population agreed, that Canada needed to have the closest possible defensive relationship with the United States in order to stave off the possibility of Soviet aggression against North America and/or West Europe.¹ Concerned primarily with the possibility of an attack by manned bombers (and later by inter-continental ballistic missiles) across the Arctic region, and worried by the threat of a potential Soviet ground attack in Europe, Canada and the United States co-operated in creating a closely knit defense system including radar installations, offensive and defensive

aircraft, missiles, and joint participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Many of the factors which led to such an arrangement changed during the 1960's. The Soviet Union phased out many of its manned bomber squadrons and reduced its commitment to ICBM's in favor of shorter-range, submarine-based missiles stationed off the coastline of North America. Strategically, these moves drastically undercut many of the defensive measures designed to prevent an attack over the pole and, with the rise of the People's Republic of China as a nuclear power, attention turned elsewhere.

Some Canadians also argued that Canada could well afford to spend less on defense (1) because the United States would defend Canada no matter how little Canada contributed to a common defense and (2) because the dangers of nuclear war had become so well known that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would engage in nuclear confrontation after their brush with it during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Still other Canadians contended that the country should reduce its military dependence on American strategy by disengaging itself from many aspects of joint defense. While the final thrust of Canadian decision-making in this area is yet to emerge, at this point Canada has taken a number of steps substantially to alter her commitment to common defense, including a reduction in Canadian participation in NATO and a marked reduction in her armed forces (from 104,000 as late as 1969 to a projected figure of 82,000 for 1972).²

Another important source of change in Canadian-American relations has been the reexamination of just how much "cooperation and interdependence" there is between the two countries. The conventional wisdom, expounded in most textbooks in use in the

¹ For some historical background on the roots of Canada's defense strategy in this century, see James Eayrs, *In Defense of Canada: From the Great War to the Depression and Appeasement and Rearmament* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964).

² Not all Canadians have accepted the advisability of this stance. John Holmes, for example, has argued that, "We may find the challenge and the cost of continental defense much greater than the simpler and perhaps even less expensive participation in Europe." See his "New Perspectives of Canadian Foreign Policy," *The World Today*, Vol. XXV, No. 10 (October, 1969), pp. 450-460.

United States, has stressed the good neighborliness and extent of that interdependence and has accented the amount of dialogue and consultation. Yet the last two decades have witnessed a substantial amount of analysis which challenges these assumptions. David Baldwin, in an extremely insightful and provocative article, states the matter quite succinctly:

Although it is probably true that one would have to take the United States greatly into account in describing either the Canadian economy or polity, American politics and economics can be explained fairly well without reference to its northern neighbor.³

Numerous Canadian scholars have echoed this theme, pointing out that while Canadians could not afford to ignore the United States, the United States could and did ignore them:

While most Canadians live near to the American border, and thus are acutely aware of the proximity of their vast and disturbing neighbor, most Americans live far away from Canada and are hardly aware of its existence as a distinct identity.⁴

Even when the decision-makers in the United States take notice of Canada or appeared to consult her leaders, it is often apparent that this consultation is of a *pro forma* nature: "The old idea that you could have a partnership of consultation and joint policies between a superpower and a lesser power is just so much rhetoric."⁵ By the 1970's, then, it had begun to appear that the United States either ignored its northern "partner" on many issues or paid only lip service to the notion of cooperation.

While some Canadians expressed dissatisfaction with the state of affairs concerning cooperation, others went further, seeing the United States as a positive menace. It was almost as if the clock had been turned back to the early nineteenth century, when the War of 1812 and the clashes and threatened invasions of 1838, 1846, 1859 and the 1860's between the two countries had evoked a mood of fear and dis-

trust. The United States, it was argued, far from engaging in a partnership with Canada, was in fact treating her like "a colony" and acting in an "imperialistic" manner.⁶

ECONOMIC DOMINATION

While many Canadians were not prepared to go this far in their indictment of the United States, they became more cognizant of the extent to which the United States dominated the economic life of their country. By 1970, for example, it was estimated that United States firms controlled over 50 per cent of Canada's manufacturing sector and, more importantly, even greater percentages of key Canadian industries. These included auto (97 per cent), rubber (91 per cent), electrical equipment (67 per cent), oil and natural gas (60 per cent). Additionally, fully 70 per cent of Canada's imports came from the United States and two-thirds of her trade was carried on with her neighbor to the south.⁷ This concern over United States domination was seen in the cultural sector as well, including anxiety over the penetration of Canada by American mass media and the number of Americans teaching in Canadian schools.⁸ The growing awareness of Canada's dependence upon the United States and the frustration of not being able to do much about it led to a widespread Canadian feeling of unease, which found its expression in a variety of forms, from cultural nationalism to separatism to a call for the nationalization of American firms.⁹

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

The concern of Canadians with their relationship with the United States was stimulated, at least in part, by what was taking place in the United States itself, which had, in the last analysis, very little to do with Canada's relationship to the United States. Whatever one's views on the entire spectrum of the problems faced by the United States during the 1960's—race relations, the war in Vietnam, American intervention in Santo Domingo, the increasing amount of political violence in the society, the rising crime rates, the growing specter of pollution and the alienation of youth—one could only conclude that their cumulative effort was to present a view of the United States to foreigners which clashed with many of their previous images of a strong, reasonably democratic country with genuine concern for the affairs of smaller states and an infectious enthusiasm and dynamism.

In the 1960's, therefore, many Canadians began to see the United States as a country not to imitate, but to fear, a country whose actions were to be watched closely in order to avoid making the same mistakes, even to avoid being contaminated by things American. Whatever the realities of the situation, American society in the 1960's seemed convulsed, di-

³ David A. Baldwin, "Canadian-American Relations: Myth and Reality," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. XII, No. 2 (June, 1968), pp. 127-150. In addition to the quote (p. 128), Baldwin also argues very persuasively that American neglect of Canada is well deserved since by world standards, Canadian problems are minimal (pp. 135-136).

⁴ George Woodcock, *Canada and the Canadians* (London: Faber and Faber, 1970), p. 303.

⁵ John W. Holmes, Director General of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, "Canada and the USA: Goodwill is Not Enough," *The Lamp* (Fall, 1971), p. 3. The title itself is highly symbolic of this line of argument.

⁶ See, for example, Walter Gordon, *Choice for Canada: Independence or Colonial Status* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966).

⁷ Woodcock, *Canada and the Canadians*, p. 304.

⁸ See, for example, James MacDonald Minifie, "Mass Media and Their Control," in Richard J. Ossenberg (ed.), *Canadian Society: Pluralism, Change and Conflict* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1971), pp. 169-183.

⁹ Arthur Davis, "Canadian Society and History as Hinterland versus Metropolis," in Ossenberg, *Canadian Society*, pp. 6-32, and Peter Newman, *The Distemper of Our Times* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968).

rectionless and disturbing. This superpower, on which Canada depended so heavily for so much, was racked with internal torment and turmoil, thrashing about in the international arena in such a way as to baffle friend and foe alike.

In other words, while some Canadians were questioning the feasibility of their increasing dependence on the United States, others were questioning its desirability. It may well be that we are too close to this set of problems to see them in perspective, and the mass media may have magnified their importance. In any case the America which, since World War II, had loomed larger than life-size began to appear disturbing, even frightening. And Canadians responded by wishing to put some distance, even psychological distance, between themselves and their southern neighbor.

A CHANGING SELF-IMAGE

If the 1960's represented a time of shifting perspectives on the United States, for many Canadians it was also a time to examine themselves and many of the assumptions they had been making about their own country. For much of this century, many Canadians—particularly those of British descent—had viewed their country as one which exhibited equality and opportunity, democracy and freedom, where a northern version of the melting pot fused peoples and blended rural and urban cultures to form one nation. In the context of open spaces and fabulous mineral wealth, there were unlimited opportunities for personal advancement.

There were numerous challenges to this vision in the 1960's. In the first place, the specific demands for separatism by the *Front de Libération de Québec* (FLQ) and the more generalized complaints of many French-speaking Canadians called into question the whole idea of a fused nation and the assumed equitable distribution of goods, services and status which the system was generating. If Canada was a colony of the United States, then Quebec, it was argued, was a colony of Canada, "a colony within a colony." Increasingly violent protests, culminating in the as-

assassination of Quebec's Minister of Labor and Immigration, Pierre Laporte (the first Canadian political assassination since 1868), seem to have isolated FLQ from its primary base of support. At the same time, its activities sharpened the demands of other French Canadians for improvement in their status.

The agitation of this portion of the community also prompted studies which indicated that Canada was indeed governed by a political and economic elite and had spawned a society where an ascriptive hierarchy, while not totally rigid, did in fact exist. John Porter's seminal study, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada*, indicated the extent to which those of British extraction, combined with a smaller number of French speaking people, occupied the dominant positions in the polity and the economy. Below them were those of German, Scandinavian and Dutch background, who in turn generally came out better than many French Canadians, Poles, Italians and Ukrainians. At the very bottom were the Eskimos and Indians, scattered about in over 500 bands and fragmented over 2,200 reservations.¹⁰

Further, despite the historical background of Canada's settlement and her extensive frontier ethos, by 1970, it was clear that the country itself was in fact 70 per cent urbanized and that the farmers represented only one-thirteenth of the work force. All the problems associated with modern, industrialized, urbanized life were therefore with Canada to stay and had to be solved, along with the very pressing situation of selective and specific regional poverty. In short, it could well be said that:

Canada today is a rich country scarred by poverty, a democracy governed and controlled by élites restricted by class, race and creed.¹¹

Canadians' dissatisfaction with their own society grew during the 1960's and blended with their apprehension of what was occurring in the United States. Coupled with the changing international situation this situation produced two important developments which cogently influence the present relationship between Canada and the United States. These are the rise of Canadian nationalism and a growing desire for an important international role, not as a puppet or even a partner of the United States or Great Britain, but as an independent, serious international actor.

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM

In part stimulated by the forces mentioned above, but also as a response to them, Canadians emerged from the 1960's on the wave of a new nationalism which accented the future and the positive and which instilled pride in being Canadian. Two events, EXPO 1967, and the election of Pierre Elliott Tru-

¹⁰ John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965). Interestingly enough, some Canadians of Italian extraction recently agitated for the use of English in their neighborhoods in Quebec, accepting the Porter thesis that the more Catholic and the more French the education, the less likely it is to provide a passport to upward mobility. For example, although French Canadians represent 30 per cent of the population of Canada, they constitute only 7 per cent of the economic elite. See Woodcock, *Canada and the Canadians*, p. 187.

¹¹ Woodcock, *Canada and the Canadians*, p. 163. For a further analysis of Canada as a multi-ethnic society, see Oswald Hall, "The Canadians' Division of Labour Revisited," and Richard Ossenberg, "Social Pluralism in Quebec: Continuity, Change and Conflict," in Ossenberg, *Canadian Society*, pp. 89-99 and pp. 103-123, as well as Harold Cadrihan, *The Unjust Society* (Edmonton, Alberta: Hurtig, 1970).

deau, in 1968, symbolized this movement and in their turn fueled it. It is always difficult to judge the historical importance of events so close to one's time, but it seems clear that the international exposition held in Montreal during 1967 (and continued on in other forms after that year) tended to focus interest on Canada (and more importantly for the purposes of this study, interest on the part of Canadians) until it became a source of great national pride.

Of even greater long-term consequence was the election of 1968, when Pierre Elliott Trudeau of the Liberal party became Canada's fifteenth Prime Minister. During the previous five years under Liberal Prime Minister Lester Pearson and prior to that, under various Conservative regimes, considerable frustration had been generated among Canadian voters and there was a pervasive sense of helplessness. Pierre Trudeau was an intellectual, a bachelor with a flair for style and the good life, who had not even joined the party until 1965. Thus his selection as his party's standard bearer on the fourth ballot of the Liberal party convention came as a surprise. Whatever his future, he was definitely the man for this particular Canadian season. Running on a platform of national unity and the establishment of a just society, he projected an image of youthful dynamism which, coupled with political realism, stirred a sense of Canadian pride and nationalism. When the returns were in, the Liberals had won an overwhelming victory with 155 seats in Parliament as opposed to 72 for the Conservatives, 22 for the New Democratic party, 14 for the Cr ditistes and 1 Independent.

With the election of Trudeau, numerous observers concluded that Canadians were no longer "... a good grey people in a stark grey land, always under some overwhelming shadow of France, or Britain, or of America, but rather ... a people capable of originality, adventurous, radical-minded, open to the future."¹² And if this new self-image, like most images, was an exaggeration, nevertheless it did point to a growing self-awareness on the part of Canadians that they should move ahead to diminish their political and economic dependence on both Great Britain and the United States wherever possible.¹³

¹² Woodcock, *Canada and the Canadians*, p. 268.

¹³ In fact, the New Democratic party, which emerged as highly successful in the 1968 elections, has within it an important wing which holds the view that Canada ought to nationalize American industrial assets as soon as possible. See Peter C. Newman, "The Thawing of Canada," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. IX, No. 2 (Summer, 1971), pp. 219-228.

¹⁴ See especially the Herb Grey Report, "Domestic Control of the National Economic Environment: The Problem of Foreign Ownership and Control," *The Canadian Forum* (December, 1971), p. 1-72. Although the report stopped short of advocating even selective nationalization, its accent on "screening," coming as it did on the heels of the Watkins Report (February, 1968) and the Wahn Report (August, 1970) suggested a continuing reappraisal of Canada's economic future.

¹⁵ Newman, "The Thawing of Canada," p. 228.

In the three years since that election, there have been a number of signs that the Canadian government is seeking to project a far more independent image than that of its predecessors, and to enlarge its options in the wider world. For example, the suggestion attributed to United States Senator Henry Jackson (Democrat) of Washington that the United States and Canada should set up a Joint Energy Board in order to share the national resources of North America met heavy opposition in Canada, and the proposal was greeted as an attempt to "share Canadian resources now that the United States had used up its own."

During 1970, Canada recognized the People's Republic of China and set about reorganizing many bilateral relationships with other countries, as Canadians realized that their large (3.8 million square miles), underpopulated (21.2 million persons) country possessed some outstanding international credentials. It was third in the world in terms of international commerce and sixth in terms of world manufacturing, with exports of \$14.8 billion and imports of \$14.2 billion in 1970. Seeking to use this position to advantage, one government White Paper in 1970 urged for the first time (at least publicly) that the Canadians use their assets and their foreign policy to advance what were termed "national interests," while another looked seriously at the possibility of insuring domestic control over the Canadian economy.¹⁴ The upshot of all this movement meant a new confidence and a new flexibility so that Canadians could say "... we seem to have joined the mainstream of history at last."¹⁵

Yet what of the future? Granted that Canada is heading toward greater independence and freedom in the international community, granted that her relationship with the United States is undergoing significant changes, what are the parameters of the possible as Canada heads into the 1970's? Clearly, Canada has options, perhaps many more than a decade ago, due to her new sense of self-awareness, her existing levels of economic development and the more polycentric nature of the world. At the same time, both the rhetoric and the ambivalence of Canada's new position have exaggerated the range of those options. Regardless of the political stance Canada's leaders may adopt internationally, the fact remains that unless there is a catastrophic wrenching away, Canada's economic life is so bound up with that of the United States that her long-range opportunities

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Christian P. Potholm is the author or co-editor of three books and several dozen articles in the fields of comparative politics and international relations. He is currently working on a book dealing with the role of the police in American society.

"The growth of economic nationalism may well be . . . the ground on which it will be possible to reconcile the differences of French and English Canada, a process in which both the separatists of the former and the continentalists of the latter will be confounded."

The Nature of Canadian Nationality

By W. L. MORTON

Vanier Professor of Canadian History, Trent University

BY CONFEDERATION in 1867 Canada made an unobtrusive beginning of her emergence as a nation. At Expo in 1967 she celebrated the first century of Confederation. There were mixed feelings, of course. Independence had not been proclaimed in 1867; in 1967 it was beyond question. Canada stretched from Atlantic to Pacific, from the American border to the pole, and was a member of the comity of nations. But separatists—a new word—were planting bombs in Montreal, a most un-Canadian activity, and French President Charles de Gaulle at Expo made no mention of Canada, but finished his speech of congratulations with the separatist slogan, *Vive le Québec Libre!*

"If forced to choose," wrote Anthony Trollope of his visit to North America in the fall of 1861, "Canada will enter herself among the nations of the earth." Canada was forced to choose by the events released by the American Civil War, and declared herself "a new nationality" in the Confederation formed in 1867. Then a nation within the British Empire, Canada has since advanced to national independence in all practical respects. Yet at the end of her first century of existence Canada is still, and often ludicrously, engaged in examining and reviewing the nature of the nationality affirmed in 1867.

There was nothing surprising in Canadians taking up the idea of nationality in 1861. In his famous *Report* of 1839 recommending self-government for Canada, John Lambdon, Lord Durham, had expressed the hope that self-government would lead to the creation "for the North American colonist of some nationality of his own." The colonial reformers who followed him saw in self-government and nationality the way to fulfill the British Empire in colonial freedom. One of them, John Robert Godley, even spoke of the "nationalizing" of the empire by the creation of colonial nations. Thomas D'Arcy McGee, who in his youth had supported the idea of an Irish nationality, found in Canada the materials for another nationality free of the tensions that had

destroyed the idea of an Irish nationality of both faiths and all kinds of Irishmen in 1848. His *Plea for a British American Nationality* was the strongest statement made of the case.

Others joined him—the English geologist, Henry Youle Hind, in the *British American Magazine*, the Canadian Alexander Morris, in his *Nova Britannia*. Even the Governor General, Charles Stanley Monck, an Irishman like Godley and McGee, accepted Godley's idea of "nationalizing" the colonies. And in the Canadian debates on the Confederation scheme, the French Canadian leader, George Etienne Cartier, was eloquent in explaining the meaning of the "political nationality" that the new federation would be. It could, he implied, include the French Canadian nation.

The American Civil War in its four-year course had forced the growth of Canadian nationality. The colonies had some reason to be alarmed at the language of manifest destiny. The war made the United States a great military power, while the struggle itself forced on the colonies the uneasy and dangerous role of neutrals. And there were two constant fears. If the North failed to conquer the South, who could say it would not seek compensation in the conquest of British America? If it did subdue the South, might it not use its power to end the anomaly of dependent colonies in North America? Only an act of self-determination, the assertion of a nationality, would make British America an acceptable neighbor of the United States.

Canada needed a nationality to survive in North America. But what kind of nationality would, and indeed could, it be? That colonies should become nations was not unprecedented. The American colonies of Britain and Spain had done so. But they had done so by acts of revolution, of independence proclaimed and asserted by force of arms. What kind of independence could be affirmed and what kind of nationality could be achieved by Act of Parliament and maintenance of the tie with the Imperial Crown?

Such procedure was, to say the least, unorthodox and unconvincing in itself.

THE NEW NATIONALITY

Then, too, the composition of the new nationality raised difficulties. The majority of the people of the federating colonies were of American, English, Irish and Scottish ancestry; a large minority were of French descent and North American by descent of almost 200 years. The much greater part of that minority, the French of Lower Canada, or Quebec, had been guaranteed the retention of their property, their faith and their civil law, and had persistently asserted the right to use their language in public business as well as in private life. Even the dispossessed Acadians had retained their faith and language.

Before the conquest had ended the tie with France in 1763, French Canadians had become different from the French of old France. Under English rule they had become even more conscious of being a "nation," a distinctive group with its own character and culture. Thus there was already in Canada a nation with every aspect of nationalism except political independence—common language, law, faith and ethnic homogeneity. Even political independence showed itself in the persistent desire of the French to have their own state within the British Empire, whether it was the old province of Lower Canada from 1791 to 1841, or the province of Quebec in the Confederation of 1867. How could so definite and self-conscious a people be part of a new nationality? They could, Cartier assured them, be part of a "political nationality" which united people of different races, languages and religions. It was to be an answer that sufficed for a century, if it did not wholly satisfy most French Canadians; some indeed embraced it as warily as did many English Canadians, and in the 1960's it was to receive a restatement by Lester Pearson's government as a "partnership" of French and English Canadians.

Before that date, however, the concept of a partnership in a political nationality was to be tested and transformed in the expansion of Confederation with the northwest and the creation of institutions in that new area of Canada. Both the English and the French had explored and traded in the northwest in the days of the fur trade; both had claimed the region to the Rockies, and had left settlers there. Its acquisition by the new Confederation was the joint enterprise of French and English Canadians. Surely therefore the northwest would be open to both English and French? But how? Religion caused no formal difficulty, because freedom of religion had long been established in Canada. But were schools to be confessional or secular? And language—were both, or one, to be official? In the new province of Manitoba, created in 1870, both languages were official and confessional schools were established. Manitoba was a province

modeled, except in law, on Quebec. Was this to be the pattern for the whole northwest?

For a few years, it seemed it might be, but few French Canadians moved to the northwest, while many English Canadians and European immigrants did. In the end, the population of the West, by a kind of squatter sovereignty, decided on secular schools and one language, English. And the West came to be, unlike Ontario or Quebec, a region of mixed, assimilated population. A third kind of nationality had taken shape in Canada, one in which the focus of nationality was not French, as in Quebec, or British (or Anglo-American), as in the Maritimes, Ontario or British Columbia, but the common evolution of a "mosaic" society in which each ethnic group might preserve its character but in which all moved towards a general but undefined likeness.

Such was the varied background of the Canadian nationality in the tenth decade of Confederation. With such a background, Canada had indeed become one of the nations of the earth. International recognition, however, did little to strengthen the ties of political nationality. For one thing, the nations with whom Canada principally associated experienced a revulsion against nationalism. Two great wars fought by nation states to preserve the principle of nationality left a sense of weariness and anxiety that the preservation of national groupings might threaten civilization itself. Nor, as Elie Kedourie pointed out, did the fervent attempts of new states to find identity as nations enhance the charm of nationalism. The nation state at best seemed no more than an expedient, and its elevation to a principle threatened or destroyed other values more significant to civilized men.

At the same time, after 1945, Canada underwent other strains. A small nation occupying half a continent, Canada had found union possible in a primary economy of regional societies knit together by railways in a largely rural country. In the 50 years after 1914, Canada had become predominantly urban and industrial, sharing an ever more conformist urban and industrial civilization; the new ties of television and air transport tied Canada as close to the rest of this world as they tied its regions one to another. Indeed, the regions are now more aware of another, and in consequence perhaps more critical of one another.

At the same time, Canada's relations with the United States suffered a slow but threatening change. From the War of Independence to the beginning of the twentieth century, fears of attack or absorption by the United States stimulated the growth of national feeling in Canada. Afterwards and particularly after World War I, American-Canadian relations became close and friendly. The United States accepted the Canadian fact: Canada felt secure alongside the United States, and began to admit and explore her own American quality. The process was inevitable;

it was in part a continuance of the liberal, internationalist opinion of the previous century, and one which in many ways broadened and enriched the character of Canadian life. It did, however, lead to the growth of American investment in Canadian resources and (encouraged by the Canadian tariff and imperial preference) in Canadian industry.

In the great acceleration of American investment after 1950, the idea of a continental economy began to oust the concept of the national economy on which Canada had rested since Confederation. The results of internationalism and continentalism were a weakening of the sense of nationality and the strengthening of the regional and provincial elements in Canadian life. American influence, which had been integrative until 1914, had begun to be disintegrative.

THE QUIET REVOLUTION

Although disintegrative in the sense of weakening national ties, American influence was general, affecting all parts of Canada equally, Quebec and French Canada as well as all the provinces of English Canada. In Quebec in 1960, nevertheless, there occurred a sudden and powerful change that was certainly and directly the result of change within that province and its relations with English Canada, but which also might have been the result—if at longer range—of the growth of American influence on Canada. That was the Quiet Revolution, a change of political style and direction which set out to make Quebec a dynamic, if different, part of Canadian and North American society.

To understand the change in Quebec itself, it is necessary to review the change since the beginning of the twentieth century. It became apparent at the beginning of the century that the equality of French and English within the province of Quebec was not in fact to be extended to the West, or to the other old provinces. For this reason, French Canadian nationalism began to withdraw from its entente with Canadian political nationality.

The beginning of that withdrawal was marked in 1896, when the courts upheld the Manitoba School Act of 1890, which abolished confessional schools in Manitoba. That same year, the voters of Quebec turned to the Liberal party under Wilfrid Laurier. The Liberal party had upheld "provincial rights" since Confederation. Quebec henceforth was to depend on its powers as a province to uphold French rights in Quebec. Yet the struggle to preserve French rights beyond Quebec continued in the dispute over schools on the occasion of the creation of the new provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905. It continued also in the early career of Henri Bourassa, grandson of Louis-Joseph Papineau, the rebel leader of 1837. Bourassa sought the creation of an all-Canadian nationality of French and English in which

the latter would be freed of imperial sentiment and Canada would be able to avoid Britain's wars.

English Canada, however, refused to listen to Bourassa, or failed to understand him. As a result, the traditional current of French Canadian nationalism, flowing since the conquest, came once more to the surface. It had been reinforced in the second half of the nineteenth century by the ultramontane movement in the Roman Catholic Church, which allied itself with nationalism in Quebec, and by the writings of nationalists like Jean-Paul Tardivel, a Franco-American repatriated in Quebec.

Partly under Bourassa's leadership, partly under that of outright French nationalists like Olivar Asselin, French Canadian nationalist sentiment returned to the hope that French Canada could establish its own state, in which French society would be severed from the influences of English Canada and of the United States. The new character of French nationalism was greatly strengthened by Canadian participation in World War I and the conflict between English and French on the need for conscription—the draft. In the 1920's, it was possible, therefore, for the distinguished historian l'Abbé Lionel Groulx to make his Department at the University of Montreal a center for nationalist thought and writing, and for his more extreme followers to talk of a republic of Laurentia which French nationalism would make its bulwark.

Oddly enough, the great depression of the 1930's did not, or did not seem to, add force to the nationalist current. It did, however, give rise to a provincial political party, the Union Nationale—a term used by the French opponents of Confederation—under the leadership of Maurice Duplessis, a politician who was to dominate Quebec until his death in 1959. Of his party it may be said that it was nationalist, conservative of old French ways, and not separatist. Duplessis himself was archaically conservative, politically shrewd and skilful, and personally ruthless—*un chef*, or boss, somewhat like Huey Long without the vulgar touch. (Perhaps the best analogy would be with many regimes in Latin America.) He and his regime faithfully reflected the mood of Quebec, antagonistic to urban and industrial growth (proceeding faster in Quebec than in any other province) and alienated from the rest of Canada.

As such it was bound to fade. The major harm it did was in its equivocal alliance with Anglo-American finance and industry. Duplessis relied on big business in Quebec for the funds which won him his electoral victories and in return kept Quebec safe for big business, even to the extent of refusing reforms.

Labor was the conscious victim of that collaboration. The reaction against Duplessis may be dated from the strike of the asbestos workers in 1949. The opposition grew over the next decade, led by union

leaders, academics, liberal politicians, intellectuals—always important people in élitist Quebec. One of them was Pierre Elliott Trudeau. The intent of this opposition was to create a Quebec that was abreast of progress in North America and the world. Opposition leaders were, in short, reformers, and not necessarily nationalists; some indeed, like Trudeau, repudiated nationalism. That remained the concern of the Union Nationale.

THE ELECTION OF 1960

When the Quebec Liberal party won power under Jean Lesage in 1960, it was a victory for reform—rational, secular reform. More profoundly, this was the first time the French Canadians had seized the state—the government of the province in which they were the majority—for their own purposes. Their own purposes comprised not only catching up with the rest of Canada and North America; some of Lesage's supporters, fired by ideas from France and the European left, meant far to excel the rather routine quality of North American life. Thus, while not nationalist, Lesage's Cabinet, and especially the invigorated civil service of Quebec, demanded powers and the exercise of powers unprecedented in Quebec, enough to strain the constitutional framework of the federal union.

In this, Quebec was exhibiting the regional spirit and political discontent evident in all the other provinces. These were dissatisfaction with the enhancement of the power of the federal government during the war and the economic expansion of the 1950's. Discontent was also the result of many demands caused by the growth of cities, particularly the demand for social welfare, which fell on municipal and provincial funds. In Canada, the taxing powers of the federal government are without constitutional limit, while those of the provinces are limited. Yet the discontents of Quebec were not merely regional and provincial; they were also, and deeply, nationalistic.

Three consequences followed the powerful torrent of reform unleashed by the Quiet Revolution. First, Liberal reform outran the resources of the province and the tolerance of Quebecers. Second, the Union Nationale was returned to power in 1966. Third, to some intellectuals, both liberal reform and the nationalism of the Union Nationale seemed totally inadequate. A mixture of neo-Marxists, existentialists and revolutionary terrorists, they saw the future of Quebec as an independent, socialist republic. The new left and the old nationalism joined hands in separatism.

As such, separatism was no great political menace even in Quebec, much less in Canada. But some men, not leftists, notably René Levesque, one of the more

ardent reformers in Lesage's government, and Jacques Parizeau, an able economist, decided that the Quebec they wanted could be found only in independence, and they set out to make separatism respectable. They had much success, and while the 23 per cent of the popular vote they won in the provincial election of 1970 no doubt exaggerated that success, they had made separatism a political issue, not merely a revolutionary movement, in Quebec.

There the matter stood until the kidnappings of James Cross and Jean Laporte in October, 1970, led to the proclamation of the War Measures Act by the federal government, headed, of course, by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau. The results of that drastic act are not yet fully apparent. It quieted Quebec; it may also have started the reconciliation of constitutional with revolutionary separatism. Witness the recent conversion of Pierre Vallières (author of *White Niggers of America*¹) to non-violence.

In any event, the old nationalist sentiment of Quebec had become to a large degree separatist, as the troubles of the former Union Nationale (now Unité Québec) reveal. At the same time, the neo-Marxist element in separatism took on the old dogmatic quality of ultramontanist.

THE REACTION OF ENGLISH CANADA

Meanwhile, faced with the joint phenomenon of a vitalized French Canadian society and of separatism, English Canada was deeply dismayed. Under the leadership of the conciliatory diplomat Lester Pearson as Prime Minister, after 1963, English Canada made repeated concessions to the new spirit of Quebec, establishing the essentially provincial Canada Pension Plan and making a place for the international representation of Quebec in educational and cultural affairs. The government attempted to revive the old, all-Canadian nationality in the adoption of a national flag. It acquiesced in the gradual retirement of monarchical symbols and ceremonials. It appointed the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, with a view to establishing the equality of the English and French languages, which was effected in the Official Languages Act of 1969.

When the Liberal party chose as its leader after Pearson the French Canadian federalist Pierre Elliott Trudeau, English Canada, along with French Canada, gave him an impressive parliamentary majority.

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W. L. Morton is a Canadian nationalist, vintage 1931, and believes in the value of the Canadian political nationality and of a national economic policy for Canada. Among his publications is *The Canadian Identity*, 2nd ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972), with an added chapter, "Stresses and Strains in Canada, 1961-1971."

¹ New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971.

"The survival of the French Canadians as a distinct community with their own language and culture and some degree of self-government in the anglophone world of North America is so remarkable that devout French Canadian historians have had no difficulty in attributing it to Divine Providence. . . . The separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada before the end of this century is a real possibility."

French and English in Canada: Uneasy Union

BY J. R. MALLORY

Professor of Political Science, McGill University

IN A COUNTRY MADE UP OF TWO cultures and two languages, the possibilities of a dialogue of the deaf are endless. The same word does not mean the same thing in both languages. Because both cultures have been nourished by their own separate traditions, myths, symbols and history they lack above all what Henry Steele Commager has called a "usable past." The Two Solitudes—as the novelist Hugh MacLennan has called them—are made more profound by the fleeting and distorted images of one another that appear in their respective histories.¹ English Canadian children are still no doubt stirred by the battle of the Plains of Abraham and the fall of Quebec: to French Canadian children this is the most tragic wound in their history. Louis Riel, the leader of the Metis and Indian revolts in Manitoba and the North West, is now being rehabilitated in the history books but, even so, most French Canadians are likely to see him as a national hero in a sense that no English-speaking Canadian can share. And while English Canadians are nourished on the heroic memories of the battle honors of Canadian regiments in two European wars, French Canadians are more likely to recall the anti-conscription riots in protest against involvement in far countries of which they knew little.

So—even if there were no contemporary causes of friction—there is no strong basis for a united Canadian nation. Indeed, the very word bedevils discussion between the two groups. When English Canadians use the word "nation" they do so in a connotation which is co-extensive with "state" (i.e. the Canadian

state), while to French Canadians it has the full evocative meaning of the ethnic group, in which the unity of the tribe is based on the tie of blood and is not the mere accident of citizenship. And causes of friction there are.

The survival of the French Canadians as a distinct community with their own language and culture and some degree of self-government in the anglophone world of North America is so remarkable that devout French Canadian historians have had no difficulty in attributing it to Divine Providence. In the beginning, after the Conquest, it was British policy which preserved the legal system and language of New France and gave to the Catholic religion a tolerance unique in the British Empire. This policy may have been conceived in magnanimity, but it was strengthened by the need to retain the loyalty of French Canadians when much of the rest of British North America was moving to the brink of revolt.

After the American Revolution, most of the Loyalist refugees from the United States who came to Canada settled at the head of the St. Lawrence River and along Lake Ontario. Until that time, the British government had acted on the assumption that representative institutions as they existed in the other American colonies were neither appropriate in the semi-feudal social system of New France nor desired by the inhabitants, so the colony of Canada was governed by a Governor and an appointed Legislative Council. While the Loyalists had sacrificed blood and treasure on the losing side in the American Revolution, they were determined to retain the system of representative government to which they had been accustomed, and the need for providing a local elected legislature became irresistible. However, in granting representative government, the British Parliament

¹See Marcel Trudel and Genevieve Jain, *Canadian History Textbooks: a Comparative Study* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970). This is one of a number of research studies done for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which is referred to below. All of the Commission's reports and its published research studies repay close study.

also divided the colony in two, roughly along the line of the Ottawa River; the English-speaking colonists in Upper Canada retained English common law, while Lower Canada with its French-speaking majority retained the French civil law, the French language, and the special privileges of the Catholic Church. Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century, in spite of the Conquest, the French Canadians had preserved their homeland, their religion, and their legal and social institutions more or less intact. Moreover, as Helen Taft Manning has shown, they soon demonstrated a sufficient flair for parliamentary institutions to be able, like their English-speaking fellows in the other colonies, to continue the struggle for greater local self-government.²

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the main mechanisms of French Canadian survival had emerged. The church assumed the role of custodian of French and Catholic values and became the central institution of national survival. By its control of the educational system it tended to channel the elites into the traditional professions of clergy, law and medicine. To the extent that this was deliberate policy, it reflected a fear that commercial and industrial expansion would undermine the rural and semi-feudal society which seemed most suited to preserve French Canada against secularization and cultural erosion. Partly for this reason, the commercial middle class in Lower Canada was predominantly composed of American, English and Scottish merchants who had settled in the colony. French Canadian historians have asserted that French Canadian society after the Conquest was a truncated one, lacking a commercial bourgeois class, so that English domination was thus consolidated; but this is now a matter of dispute. What is not in dispute is the fact that the English minority in the province was more urban (Montreal in mid-century was still about half English-speaking) and generally in control of commercial wealth. As a consequence the Rebellion of 1837 was, in part at least, a racial conflict.

It is no accident that the FLQ cells of 1970 adopted the names of the heroes of the Rebellion, that the flag of the *patriotes* became the most prominent symbol in demonstrations, and that the manifestos of the kidnap cells were produced on paper decorated by the crude sketch of a *patriote* with a musket. The British government's response to the rebellions in the two Canada's in 1837 was to send the Earl of Durham to cope with the situation. His *Report* remains one of the most important documents in Canadian history.

THE DURHAM REPORT

Durham has been the object of execration by French Canadian historians ever since because he

urged that the British policy of preserving the French Canadians as a separate group should be abandoned as unrealistic and fatal to the development of a progressive and self-governing society in British North America. He believed that the national character of Lower Canada should become that of the vast majority of the population of British North America and of the English race, which was bound to be predominant in the whole of North America.

With that devotion to half measures to which imperial powers are prone, the British government did not follow all of Durham's recommendations. Yet it did not concede further self-government, and it did re-unite the two Canadas into a single colony. This failed to destroy the French Canadian nation. After responsible (i.e., Cabinet) government was conceded in 1848, the executive government in the colony became the government of the legislative majority. But Canadian politicians found that the only way to achieve stable majorities was by the combination of like-minded parties in the two halves of the province. This working compromise became a sort of unacknowledged federal system characterized by double majorities and a good deal of autonomy in each of the two parts that made up the colony. But the system also produced a growing political stalemate, from which the ultimate outcome was a federal union including the Maritime Provinces, in which the province of Canada was again divided into its historic components under the new names of Ontario and Quebec.

Within the new federal union, the French Canadians obtained majority control of their own province, which had exclusive jurisdiction over their distinctive system of civil law as well as over education and local institutions generally. Within the larger federation, French Canadians developed a veto power which stemmed from the necessity of strong representation for them in the federal Cabinet and from the fact that no majority party could govern effectively without strong support from the bloc of members of Parliament from Quebec.

It therefore seemed that the strategy of assimilation which had been recommended in the Durham Report had been repudiated by events, and that the Canadian federation gave to the French Canadians the political strength and protection in the constitution which would ensure the survival of a French community in North America. Within the basic necessity of preserving Quebec as a rural and stable society immunized by the language barrier and its own closely knit social system from the dreaded secularization of nineteenth century societies, French Canadian political leaders concentrated on a defense and expansion of "provincial rights" in the constitution against the threat of centralization.

In this they were more successful than in dealing with issues which transcended the boundaries of

² Helen Taft Manning, *The Revolt of French Canada 1800-1835* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1962).

Quebec. Their first major defeat was in the North West which, before the construction of the trans-continental railway, was the preserve of the fur trade. The inhabitants of this vast region, in addition to the Indians, were the Metis—a half-breed mixture of French, Scottish and Indians—who had lived primarily off the fur trade since the days when the North West Company of Montreal had fought over the region with the Hudson's Bay Company. When settlement came to the new frontier it came almost entirely from English Canada, the United States, and later from Europe. The Metis were driven to rebellion, first in Manitoba in 1870 and then on the Saskatchewan in 1885. Both rebellions were put down, and the West became English-speaking territory in which the surviving French-speaking minorities were gradually deprived of their separate schools and their capacity for survival. Later, in Ontario, Orange Protestant fervor threatened to destroy the French Canadian community in that province by depriving the French Canadians of the right of instruction in French in the schools.

In the middle years of the nineteenth century, a further development encouraged the French Canadians to turn inward upon Quebec. Economic depression produced severe population pressure on the resources of the province and led to heavy emigration, mostly to the industrial towns of neighboring New England. Such internal migration has been characteristic of both Canada and the United States, but only for the French Canadians was it a final loss. For the exiled French Canadian, whether in Ontario or New England, soon lost his language and disappeared into the anglophone mass of North America, never to return to his original culture and his mother tongue. Attempts to arrest this by encouraging rural migration to the inhospitable lands of the Laurentian shield produced little except hardship for the unfortunate pioneers, as readers of Louis Hémon's novel *Maria Chapdelaine* will recall.

At the same time, French Canadian political leaders were unsuccessful in resisting the imperialist fervor of English Canadians, who enthusiastically supported Canadian contingents in the Boer War, and with ever greater zeal supported Britain to the full extent of Canada's resources in both World Wars. On these issues the two "founding races" were in complete disagreement. To most French Canadians, who had been abandoned by France in 1763, Europe was a remote world of no concern, and the conscription of their young men was stubbornly resisted. It became increasingly clear that on major issues, such as defense, foreign affairs, and westward expansion, the English-speaking majority would have its way and

could not be resisted by the French-speaking minority.

The ultimate stage of this defensive posture of French Canada was achieved under the long rule of Premier Maurice Duplessis of Quebec, who held office through most of the quarter century which ended with his death in 1959. During this time of war and postwar boom, the most striking factor in Canada was the growing power of the federal government under whose auspices the main foundations of the modern welfare state were being created, chiefly by means of federally supported joint programs with the provinces. Duplessis was an uncompromising foe of this centralizing trend, not only because he felt that the new federal policies were an invasion of provincial jurisdiction, but because he had a deep conservative distrust of the growing role of the state. The traditional society of Quebec which he sought to preserve was one in which many of the modern responsibilities of government, from higher education to social welfare, were thought to be more appropriately the function of private bodies. In a traditional Catholic society this meant that they were controlled and operated by emanations of the Church. In short, he defended provincial jurisdiction over these matters because he did not think it right that any government should intervene in them.

But while Duplessis, like King Canute, seemed to be bidding the tides of twentieth century urban industrialization to halt, he was at the same time creating the conditions which would destroy his policy in the end. Large multinational corporations in the extractive industries, such as mining and forest products, were attracted to the province by generous concessions, low taxes and the marked hostility of the provincial government to the trade union movement. Thus, in spite of the official strategy of keeping Quebec predominantly rural and agricultural, the population was inexorably being transformed into an urban proletariat. And industrial growth combined with the introduction of television was creating a whole new bourgeoisie of engineers, technicians, reporters, broadcasters, and trade union organizers.

THE NEW NATIONALISM

This has led to a revolutionary change in the character of French Canadian nationalism. The new elites totally reject the old bucolic dream of a Catholic, traditional, peasant society whose strength lay in its separation from the outside world. The old nationalism was defensive: the new nationalism is trying to build a new society. "Its aim," says Professor Charles Taylor, "is not to defend the traditional way of life, but to build a modern French society on this continent. In its pure form, practically the only value it has in common with the old is the French language itself."³

The Liberal government of Quebec which came to

³ "Nationalisms and the Political Intelligentsia: A Case Study," *Queen's Quarterly*, Vol. LXXII, No. 1 (Spring, 1965).

power the year after Duplessis' death embarked on what has been called the Quiet Revolution in order to modernize French Canadian institutions from top to bottom. Its leaders believed that the only effective instrument for building up the French Canadian nation was to use the power of the only government which they could control—that of the Province of Quebec. Their theme was no longer *survance* but *épanouissement*. If French Canadians could not achieve control of the great Anglo-American corporations they could nevertheless use the power of the state to improve the lot of the French Canadian worker and to create the conditions of the good life as understood by middle class professionals. And for this the crucial issue was language. In the past, the language of the shop floor might have been French, but it was likely that even the foreman was English-speaking. The denial of opportunity in Quebec often led French Canadians out of the province to seek their fortunes elsewhere in Canada. The price of this was to learn English, to reduce French to the language of the home and even to expose the children to English schools and churches. Even in Quebec English was the predominant language of the world of work.

At the same time that the language issue came to the fore, there came alarming news from the demographers. As long as their birthrate remained high, French Canadians felt a sense of security in sheer numbers. In spite of the heavy immigration of the twentieth century, almost all of which had assimilated into the English-speaking majority, the proportions between the French-speaking and the English-speaking communities remained at worst stable, and the possibility remained that higher fertility would gradually alter the proportions of the Canadian population in favor of French Canadians. It first became evident after the 1951 census that urbanization was taking its toll. The birthrate in Quebec was falling.

The fears which this generated were intensified by population projections developed by three demographers at the University of Montreal, which were published in the newspaper *Le Devoir* in November, 1969. Basing their projections primarily on immigration figures and estimates of fertility among French Canadians, the demographers reached ominous conclusions. On the "least unfavorable" estimate, the French-speaking population of metropolitan Montreal would drop from 66.4 per cent in 1961 to 60 per cent in the year 2000. On the "most unfavorable" estimate, the French-speaking population of Montreal would fall to 52.7 per cent by 2000.

It now seems that these estimates were excessively alarmist, for in the past few years the number of immigrants to Quebec has fallen drastically, and there has been substantial emigration, most of which is probably English-speaking, from the province. But

the consequence has been to produce very heavy pressure on the Quebec government to enact a "language policy" which would make French the sole official language of the province and the required language of the work place, as well as to erode the established English-language system of schools (which while nominally divided on a basis of Protestant-Catholic are in practice largely English-Protestant and French-Catholic). This might be done in part by compelling the children of immigrants to attend French language schools, and in part by reorganizing the educational system to do away with the constitutionally guaranteed denominational school system and unifying it. A bill currently before the Quebec legislature which would unify all the school boards in Greater Montreal (and thus reduced the anglophones to minority status on all but two of the subordinate boards) was strongly resisted by the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal because it threatened to remove the separate status of Protestant boards. Paradoxically, what forced the withdrawal of the bill was the objection that it did not go far enough by failing to abolish the right—which now exists in law—of parents to send children to schools of their choice.

A DUAL CULTURE

Meanwhile, the federal government itself was at long last beginning to take seriously the plight of the French language and culture in Canada as a whole. In 1963, the Liberal government of Lester Pearson appointed a Royal Commission of Enquiry on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to recommend measures to strengthen the dual culture of Canada. The Commission immediately began an ambitious program of research, and held hearings throughout the country. By the beginning of 1965, it had produced its first Interim Report, calling attention to the gravity of the problem, particularly in those parts of Canada outside Quebec where few if any bilingual facilities existed, and where French language communities were suffering a rapid attrition of their language. In response to the prodding of the Commission, the federal government has taken a number of measures, the most significant of which aimed at ameliorating the language problem in Ottawa and outside Quebec generally.

Attempts to enlist the cooperation of the provinces in matters outside federal jurisdiction were only partly successful, but the federal Parliament passed an Official Languages Act in 1969. This act confers official status on the two languages, insofar as this can be done within federal jurisdiction, by recognizing them as equal in Parliament, in the federal courts and in federal administrative agencies. During the same period, aggressive attempts were made to recruit francophones into the federal public service, both to ensure that agencies that deal with the public will be

able to use both languages, and to restore the proportion of francophones in the higher ranks of the bureaucracy. One of the unintended side effects of the merit system in the public service had been to cut off much of the flow of French Canadian candidates into the higher administrative jobs. This had not been due to the lack of competence of French-speaking candidates, but to the fact that very few French Canadians until recently had specialized in either the applied or the social sciences from which most higher civil service appointments were made. Many applicants who might nevertheless have been qualified were reluctant to compete for posts where the working language was exclusively English, and which required them to establish their families in the anglophone environment of Ottawa.

Much of the federal response to the challenge to create at least a limited degree of bilingualism and biculturalism would have arisen anyway, for the plight of French Canadians publicized by the B. and B. Commission evoked a sympathetic response from English Canada. It received greater impetus from the policy and personality of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who became Prime Minister in 1968. Trudeau is both a strong federalist and a man skeptical of the values of extreme nationalism. He had resisted the compromises of the early 1960's which were gradually creating a de facto separate status for Quebec and which would, in his view, lead logically to Quebec independence by slowly breaking the ties between Quebec and the rest of Canada. What he most disliked was the possibility that the federal government would gradually lose legitimacy in Quebec, as the government of the province came more and more to represent the sole visible government to Quebecers. Accordingly, he created a strong presence from Quebec in the federal Cabinet and conceived the main role of the federal government as ameliorating regional disparities (which would reduce resentment in Quebec caused by adverse economic conditions) and strengthening bilingualism and biculturalism throughout Canada.

While this posture was not without effect, the momentum of nationalist or near-separatist sentiment behind Quebec politicians remained strong. The year 1970 was to produce in Quebec a number of events whose effects are not yet wholly visible. As the year began, the governing party in Quebec, the Union Nationale, was faltering to disintegration. The death of its astute leader, Daniel Johnson (a good many French Canadians have Irish or Scottish surnames), had been a blow from which it never fully recovered. Torn between its conservative rural wing and its extreme nationalist faction, clearly unable to deal with the problems with which it was confronted, it succumbed to a crushing defeat in the election of April 29, 1970. What undoubtedly contributed to the disaster was the decision of the Social Credit party

(which had hitherto confined itself to federal politics) to enter the provincial campaign. The Social Crediters made heavy inroads on the traditional rural base of the Union Nationale. Meanwhile, the more radical urban wing succumbed to a more extreme nationalist party, the Parti Quebecois. As so often happens in multiparty contests, the winning Liberal party emerged with a disproportionately large majority, 72 seats in a legislature of 108. The Liberals, led by the youthful Robert Bourassa, campaigned on a policy of practical and "profitable" federalism rather than confrontation with the federal government. They argued that federalism could be made to pay by a policy of exacting more financial help from Ottawa through negotiation, and by an economic expansion symbolized by the promised creation of 100,000 new jobs.

But while the Liberals had gained nearly three-quarters of the seats, the results of the popular vote gave over 23 per cent to the Parti Quebecois. This party, made up of a merger of various separatist groups and led by René Levesque, an attractive and highly effective former Liberal Cabinet minister, made a remarkably strong showing in the elections. In the political spectrum, it is distinctly to the left of the Liberals, though its program and ideology reflect the fact that it has attracted to its leadership a group of intellectuals and middle class professional people. Its active supporters are to a great extent youthful and generally urban, and its greatest electoral successes were in heavily working class areas.

That the PQ could in effect persuade almost one voter in four to vote in favor of an independent Quebec was ominous enough. What was worse, the meager seven seats which the party won might further disillusion the electorate, particularly the young, with democratic politics.

The other major event of the year was the October crisis which arose from the kidnappings of James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner in Montreal, and of Pierre Laporte, the Minister of Labor in the Quebec government and the most powerful man in the Quebec Cabinet next to the Premier himself. These kidnappings were the work of cells of the *Front de Liberation du Quebec*, the latest manifestation of a series of revolutionary groups which had been active

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J. R. Mallory has taught at McGill University for 25 years. He was chairman of the Department of Economics and Political Science from 1959 to 1969, and chairman of the Social Science Research Council of Canada from 1964 to 1967. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada in 1964. His most recent book is *The Structure of Canadian Government* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1971). He has contributed to books and professional journals on Canadian political and constitutional development.

"The shadow of the United States dominates the relations of Canada with 'the world' in the way that Great Britain dominated Canadian diplomacy in the 1910's. The relationship is friendly, but overwhelming enough to lead Canada to seek relief in occasional liaisons elsewhere. The success or failure of these contacts will define the success or failure of Trudeau's foreign policy."

Canada and the World in the Seventies

BY ROBERT BOTHWELL

Lecturer in History, University of Toronto

IN THE 1920's, CANADIANS drew a laborious distinction between categories of the external world. Countries outside the British Commonwealth were labeled "foreign"; countries inside, like Canada, were "British." It is a nicety that would occur to few Canadians today. Instead, countries outside North America are called "foreign," by most Canadians. And then there is the United States.

Just as Canada's relations with Great Britain dominated and determined her relations with the rest of the world before 1939, so Canadian relations with the United States are a constant factor in other sectors of foreign relations. As a commentator on Canadian external relations put it recently, "Canada exists and will continue to exist by sufferance of the United States." Most rational observers follow the same line, willingly or not. Whatever policies are followed by Canada outside North America are influenced, positively or negatively, by the existence of the United States, which so overshadows Canada.

The realization of this fact has been a major factor in the evolution of Canadian diplomacy since 1945. Canadian diplomacy was based on attention to the Commonwealth, to Western security and to the needs of the United Nations, in which Canada placed greater faith than did the United States. It was sustained by a remarkable, almost unique consensus on foreign policy that permitted the governments to use foreign relations as a reinforcement for their internal prestige. Foreign policy, crudely put, was a political asset rather than a political liability. The conduct of foreign policy lent luster to Canadians' self-esteem. The Department of External Affairs established and maintained a reputation for competence and even brilliance in the performance of its duties. As if to cap this halcyon period, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, received the Nobel Peace Prize for his feats of diplomacy during the Suez Crisis of 1956.

Canadians could, therefore, take a snug attitude toward their performance in foreign affairs in the postwar period. Canada's fortuitous "strength" in international trade (bolstered by the weakness of a devastated Europe and Japan) made Canada a relatively important country. Historical myth exaggerated this relative importance by ascribing a mediatory position to Canada, so conveniently suited to interpret Britain to the United States, and vice versa. This myth, as we now know, had little basis in fact, at least for the period 1914-1945. While documentation is not yet available for the postwar decades, it would not be unreasonable to anticipate a similar record. This myth, the "lynch-pin" delusion, has been peculiarly tenacious, and in the 1960's and the 1970's it has also extended itself to areas outside the old "North Atlantic Triangle."

The intermediate function lends itself very well to another staple of Canadian external practice, the "middle power." It provides a semi-historical justification for this otherwise vague concept, which flourished during the postwar period. As John Holmes points out, it permitted some useful diplomatic initiatives at a time when great powers were unwilling or unable to intervene in crisis situations. Pearson's performance in the 1950's and Canada's subsequent emergence as a perpetual participant in United Nations peacekeeping forces in Sinai, Cyprus and the Congo seemed to confirm Canada's position as a middle power, which could be entrusted with impartial power in explosive situations.

Although Canada provided functional aid in these situations, she seldom had much to do with defining them. The difference between the role of an honest broker and that of a choreboy may be a fine one, but it is present. During the 1960's it became more prominent, and discontent with foreign policy increased proportionately. This discontent was associated with

other factors, of course. During the Conservative regime of John Diefenbaker (1957–1963), the previous general consensus on foreign policy, in which the major item for dispute was whether enough attention was being paid to Great Britain, disintegrated. On the one hand, critics assaulted the Diefenbaker government's evangelical style of foreign policy, which they judged to be bluster without substance; on the other, some questioned Canada's continuing commitment to the Western alliance. Although this line of attack primarily affected Canadian-American relations, it also weakened the force of public opinion behind the government's foreign policy.

The first school of critics exploited Diefenbaker's politically fatal mismanagement of defense and foreign policy. In 1936, it greeted the return to power of the Liberals under Lester Pearson, symbol of Canada's vanished prominence in foreign relations. Instead of a return to vanished glories, however, the Pearson government brought a low-key approach to foreign policy. Without discarding the older themes of foreign policy—"middle power," the United Nations, peacekeeping, and Western security—the government drew in Canadian horns from the exposed position in which Diefenbaker had left them.

COMPETITION FROM QUEBEC

Pearson's term in office was complicated, too, by the emergence of a competing "Canadian" foreign policy, that of the Province of Quebec. Provincial usurpations in the area of foreign policy are inevitable in a federal state, especially one like Canada which depends on concurrent provincial legislation for the implementation of treaties that infringe provincial jurisdictions. Prior to 1960, conflicts had emerged in the realm of social policy or in economic policy. After 1960, and particularly after 1963, the conflict between Canada and Quebec also included the cultural and political destinies of the people of Quebec. An umbrella agreement between Canada and France (*accord cadre*, 1965) authorized agreements between provincial governments and France in the field of education, a provincial responsibility.

As relations between Quebec and the federal government deteriorated, President Charles de Gaulle's France took a greater interest in events in Canada. The sequel is well-known: de Gaulle's calculated assault on the union between Quebec and the rest of Canada during his state visit in 1967 and after. Relations between Canada and France touched a new low, and did not begin to improve until de Gaulle's departure from the Elysée. Matters were complicated by the uncomfortable memory that the extension of Canadian relations with other countries had followed much the same pattern in the 1910's and 1920's. Ultimately, Canada had detached her sovereign diplomatic identity from Great Britain. Would Quebec

do the same? The ambiguous attitude of the Union Nationale government in Quebec was unpromising. Although there was some improvement in 1969–1970, only the election of a clearly federalist government in Quebec in April, 1970, restored a temporary equilibrium.

The 1960's, therefore, saw an unprecedented questioning—among citizens, informed commentators and rival governments—of the federal government's ability and right to handle Canada's external relations. This, coupled with a growing awareness of the consequences of the disparity in strength and power between Canada and the United States, drained initiative from Ottawa. The 1960's had begun optimistically; the 1970's saw questions as to whether there would be a Canadian foreign policy at the decade's end.

It is not surprising that Pierre Elliott Trudeau's government, in office since 1968, has taken a reserved attitude towards foreign policy. It promised a reassessment of Canadian external policies and conducted a two-year inquest into the prospects and conduct of a foreign policy for Canadians. This prospect was advanced before the election of June, 1968; the election could in some minor measure be taken to be a ratification of Trudeau's election promise.

THE ROLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH

The external situation that the government confronted was not promising. The Commonwealth, which until 1960 could be counted on to excite nostalgia among Canadians, visibly bored pundits and the public. Its significance had been blunted by the continued decline in tangible British political and military power, effectively destroying the illusion that Britain could serve as a counterweight to American influence. Its moral strength had been sapped by the long series of coups d'état in Asian and African Commonwealth nations, and the suspicion grew that their interests and Canada's were only remotely connected. Once the vestigial emotion of Empire was removed, Canadian interest in Asia and Africa plummeted. For more prominent commentators, the third world was a worthy substitute, but for most Canadians this amorphous concept was a feeble replacement for the traditional ties to the Empire.

Commonwealth trade was a bulwark of political purpose. The Ottawa Agreements of 1932 were still in force, but the proportion of British trade in the Canadian export-import picture drifted downwards. Canada was a leading force in South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth in 1961; but trade agreements with South Africa remained in force. The growing incoherence of the Commonwealth preferential trade structure was reinforced by the certainty of its eventual demise. The British decision to enter the Common Market signaled the inevitable; the 1960's were spent waiting for the event. Great Britain's

increasing identification with Europe was apparent to Canadians, as were the irrefutable trade and investment figures.

These trends had been evident, but unadmitted, in the 1950's. Not only Canada's foreign policy, but Canada's national identity, was based on tension between the poles of London and New York or Washington. Canada had emancipated herself from British tutelage partly by invoking the Canadian conception of North America and the United States. Just when North America and the United States seemed to have achieved an overwhelming predominance, Britain was no longer there. There seemed to be no reciprocal opportunity to invoke the old world to relieve the imbalance of the new. The disappearance of Great Britain, far from producing a new post-colonial Canadian identity, only seemed to exacerbate Canadian insecurity.

At this juncture, a French writer, Claude Julien, entered the debate with the suggestion that Canada was Europe's "last chance"—and vice versa. This advice, first published in 1965, was repeated to a Canadian parliamentary committee in 1970. Julien argued that the international positions of Canada and Europe, relatively minor allies of the United States, were similar. Canada's traditionally moderating role in international relations was a suitable model for Canadians and Europeans. The middle powers must together protect their interests—always in collaboration with the United States, of course. He assured Canadians that a "sufficient number" of well-informed Europeans appreciated Canada.

With the removal of Charles de Gaulle from the scene, this seemed to offer a genuine, self-interested alternative policy for Canada. If Britain was entering Europe, so, after a fashion, could Canada. It was unclear, and remains unclear, how this can be accomplished. There have been few indications of extraordinary interest on the part of Europeans in their "last chance"; a recent Canadian attempt to secure preferred status at the European Economic Community headquarters in Brussels was refused.

In the areas of development and investment, always of concern to Canada, European investment shows no signs of matching American. As long as this is the case, the various provincial governments will look with suspicion at any policy which might disturb American money without bringing in compensating amounts from elsewhere. Canadian-European relations must contend with European disinterest and Canadian reluctance. No federal government could go far in this direction without pausing to weigh the internal political consequences of its action.

At the opposite end of the continent, the province

of British Columbia looks south, to the United States, and east towards China and Japan. But after a century of gazing into the setting sun, British Columbia has still not found the promised transoceanic prosperity. While Canadian trade with Japan is important and increasing, it is still relatively minor, compared to the principal items in Canada's export budget. While it is important, it is not a substitute. The Japanese, too, are reluctant to enter into a special bilateral relationship with Canada. The Japanese-Canadian ministerial committee, set up in 1961, is, according to one commentator, "suggestive of the importance attached by both national governments to periodic group exchanges of views on matters of mutual concern. . . ."¹ More to the point would be the number of meetings the committee has actually held, and its inability to produce a common front in the face of President Richard Nixon's economic offensive in the fall of 1971. This is, indeed, "suggestive of [its] importance." Tokyo will not balance the loss of London.

THE THIRD WORLD AND EAST EUROPE

The third world and East Europe fall into different categories. Neither has presented itself, in 1968 or later, as the desired alternative for Canadian foreign policy. Both are, however, of sufficient importance to segments of Canadian opinion to merit further comment.

Trudeau, when he came to power, was believed to be on the left in politics. In 1963, he had loudly denounced Pearson's switch to support for nuclear arms for American missiles inside Canada as a betrayal of the cause of peace. Trudeau had visited Moscow; he was suspect in clerical circles in his native province of Quebec. Yet when he became Prime Minister he appointed one of the least radical of men, Mitchell Sharp, as Minister of External Affairs. His early foreign policy pronouncements, on Vietnam and NATO, were described as "conservative." He had, however, little experience in foreign affairs, and his first ventures in that area were modest.

When agitation arose over Biafra and Bangladesh, the government's reaction was cool, in the face of political and media clamor. Trudeau's indifference to the issues raised by the several interventionist groups over Biafra may prove, in the event, to have been rational, sensible and, in the final analysis, an accurate reflection of the minds of the Canadian people. The government's aloofness caused some resentment, however, in the minds of those for whom humanitarianism took precedence over *raison d'état*.

Trudeau consistently referred critics to his policy study, which remained under consideration until June, 1970. At that time, the government produced six brightly colored pamphlets which were described as an outline for Canadian policy in the 1970's. The pamphlets, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, examined areas

¹ Lorne Kavic, "Canada-Japan Relations," *International Journal*, XXVI, Summer, 1971, 568.

of foreign policy, both regional and institutional, and tried to suggest what the bases of Canadian policy should be in each instance.

Under the layers of platitudes that typify most Canadian discussion of foreign policy, there is little doubt that the study did suggest a realistic, realizable policy. Recognizing that policies have both realistic and idealistic components, it tried to find ways to balance the two, without arriving at a complete impasse. Such a balanced policy could hardly be venturesome, and Trudeau's is not.

Trudeau's reassessment begins with the premise that the people of Canada have become "disillusioned" with foreign policy, as practiced under the Diefenbaker and Pearson regimes. The peacekeeping role, the source of so much Canadian pride in the 1960's, has proved of limited value and importance. Vietnam has not required a peacekeeping force; the United Nations force in the Middle East was ignominiously dismissed shortly before fighting began in 1967. The humiliation was keenly felt in Canada; subsequently there has been a corresponding reluctance to get involved in other helpful international roles.

The traditional "middle power" role also came under assault from another direction. Peacekeeping and quiet influence within the Western alliance might not, after all, correspond to real Canadian interests. The gap between expenditure and result was becoming apparent at home and was producing "public disenchantment." The question was raised whether the External Affairs Department was being maintained as an outdoors club for hyperactive diplomats with little reference to the real needs of the Canadian people. The diplomats tended to define Canadian foreign policy in terms of their own function; but others asked what that policy was in the first place.

THE TRUDEAU PRESCRIPTION

Having analyzed popular discontent with foreign policy, the government began its prescription. The Canadian goal in foreign policy—the view of the majority of Canadians—was defined as "the highest level of prosperity consistent with Canada's political preservation as an independent state." In the Canadian government's policy, the preservation of independence has the highest priority; prosperity takes second place; and humanitarian values, third. These aims are broken into six policy "themes": fostering economic growth, safeguarding sovereignty and independence, working for peace and security, promoting social justice, enhancing the quality of life, and ensuring a harmonious natural environment. These platitudes have readily translatable political and economic equivalents, from NATO to the preservation of natural resources against "wasteful utilization." All cannot be equally emphasized, and some contradiction between themes is recognized. For the short term, the government's

policies will be based on appropriate responses to predicted situations. Over the long term, the government "is firmly convinced" that a deployment of resources in limited fields of expertise will be to Canada's best advantage.

Two problems of extreme importance confront Canada: the maintenance of national unity—threatened by internal racial and constitutional divisions—and the presence of the United States. No single specific policy seems to have been adopted for the latter, but for the former, the government has put its emphasis on the necessity for economic strength and stability.

The novelty of Trudeau's foreign policy lies in the importance assigned to economic factors in foreign policy. The other, older themes linger in a diplomatic half-life. Their survival will not depend on any new emphasis that the government can give them.

The half-life is tenacious, particularly with reference to European policy, to which the government dedicates a special booklet. A large segment of the Canadian population was born in Europe, and memories are long, particularly for the East European immigrants. In his prime, Diefenbaker balanced his advocacy of disarmament with stump anti-Communist speeches for these groups; their numbers and their concentration in certain areas make them a significant political factor in about one-third of Canadian parliamentary constituencies. Obviously, Canadian policies in favor of NATO and against the Soviet Union will be affected by their political power.

Despite this internal check, it was in NATO that Canadian policy was first significantly altered. Canadian forces in Europe were halved, coincident with an overall reduction in the Canadian armed forces. From a functional perspective, the government's assessment of the utility of Canadian forces in NATO was negative; one may surmise that those remaining serve a political rather than a military end. The withdrawal of Canadian troops aroused strong criticism, inside and outside Canada, but particularly from Canada's European NATO allies. What strong military arguments there might have been for keeping the troops in European garrisons were not generally apparent, and the troops returned home without significant internal opposition.

The same was not true of another Canadian initiative: Trudeau's visit to the Soviet Union, originally scheduled for October, 1970, and finally made in the summer of 1971. Relations between the Soviet

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Robert Bothwell is finishing his doctoral work in Canadian-British-American diplomatic history at Harvard. He lectures in history at the University of Toronto.

"... regionalism underlies all discussions of the major political issues in Canada today. Constitutional revision, western discontent among primary producers, the place of Quebec in Confederation, the possible union of the Maritime provinces—all these have a regional basis."

The Canadian Political System: An Overview

BY ROBERT J. DRUMMOND
Lecturer in Political Science, York University

IN 1867, WHEN THE THREE BRITISH COLONIES of Canada East and West, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick united to form the Dominion of Canada, around 90 per cent of the combined population was of British or French ethnic origin. In 1961, just over 74 per cent claimed British or French ethnicity and 87 per cent of the population cited English or French as their mother tongue. It is thus scarcely surprising that Canadian political history reflects, on the one hand, the impact of British parliamentary traditions and, on the other, the aspirations and demands of a significant (around 30 per cent) French-Canadian minority, mainly resident in the Province of Quebec.

While the English-speaking founding fathers favoured a unitary system with a sovereign Parliament, their French-speaking counterparts looked to a federal system for the assurance of their cultural survival. When a federal solution was accepted, the anglophones sought to give greatest strength (and residual powers) to the central government, while the francophones favoured provincial autonomy as a guarantee of "*la survivance*." In the years since Confederation, the provincial autonomy initially demanded by French Canadians has become almost equally prized

within an increasingly diverse English Canada.¹ Thus while the British North America Act of 1867 (the BNA Act) readily permits a strong centralist interpretation, the intentions of the founders were mixed, and judicial review and inter-governmental negotiation have from time to time shifted considerably the distribution of power between the levels of government. The result in recent years has been a congeries of agreements, piecemeal arrangements and joint federal-provincial programs which has sometimes been labeled "cooperative federalism."²

The BNA Act of 1867 is sometimes referred to as Canada's constitution; however, the constitution is only partly written, and the BNA Act is only a portion of the written text. Professor R. M. Dawson (as revised by Norman Ward) cites 17 acts of the British government which amended the BNA Act (itself a British statute) and 2 further amendments passed by the Canadian Parliament under the authority granted in 1949 to amend the Act

except as regards provincial matters and subjects, constitutional guarantees regarding education and the use of the English or French language, and the parliamentary annual session and five year maximum term.³

In addition, most constitutional authorities would include the 1931 Statute of Westminster as a document of constitutional significance for Canada, and some would include others of the more than 75 British statutes passed since 1867 which referred to Canada. There are also British orders-in-council which form part of the Canadian constitution, and there have been a number of Canadian constitutional statutes which, though enacted by the Canadian Parliament, cannot be amended by it.⁴ Some laws, by virtue of their purpose and content, form part of the "unwritten" constitution in the sense that they may be amended or repealed by the Canadian Parliament which passed them but are not likely to be

¹ See for example E. R. Black and A. C. Cairns, "A Different Perspective on Canadian Federalism," *Canadian Public Administration*, IX (1), March, 1966, 27-45.

² For a fuller discussion of cooperative federalism see D. V. Smiley, "Cooperative Federalism: An Evaluation," in J. P. Meekison (ed.), *Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality*, 2nd edition (Toronto: Methuen, 1971), pp. 320-337.

³ R. M. Dawson, *The Government of Canada*, 5th edition, revised by Norman Ward (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 120. Dawson and Ward's 7th chapter provides an excellent brief overview of Canadian constitutional development, and Chapter 2 gives a detailed description of the nature of the constitution.

⁴ Dawson and Ward cite the examples of the Acts forming Alberta and Saskatchewan which were passed by the Dominion Parliament but could be amended only by the respective provincial legislatures. *op. cit.*, p. 63.

changed since they deal with the establishment of some institution of government.⁵

The documentary Canadian constitution deals mainly with the structures of federalism—the balance between levels of government, the relationship of the Canadian government to that of the United Kingdom, and the guarantee of certain linguistic and educational rights. The relationships of the Cabinet to the Governor-General and to Parliament have been allowed to evolve mainly through custom and convention—the non-documentary constitution. Nonetheless, the regional and ethnic cleavages which made Canadian federalism necessary have loomed so large in her political history that scholars have devoted a great deal of effort to the understanding of constitutional amendment, judicial review and the questions surrounding the “repatriation” of the documentary constitution.⁶ The difficulty in designing a new Canadian constitution (or satisfactorily amending the present one) have reflected two principal controversies. On the one hand, Canadians have disagreed about the degree of autonomy which can be granted to the provincial governments if a desired national unity is to obtain. On the other hand, there has been controversy over the desirability of entrenching in a written document many of the customary relations, rights and privileges of Canadian people and institutions. How much ambiguity can we afford in providing a reliable guide for government activity; how much rigidity can we risk if we are to cope with the rapidly changing social and economic conditions of the twentieth century?⁷ A tentative agreement on a new constitution was hammered out by the Dominion and provincial Prime Ministers at Victoria, British Columbia, in the spring of 1971. It was rejected by only the Quebec government, because it failed to guarantee the provinces a large enough role in the development of social and cultural policy and the control of attendant funds. However, at the Dominion-provincial conference which followed the rejection of the Victoria Charter, the Prime Ministers

of Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia seemed to echo the Quebec government's call for provincial autonomy in those social policy areas (although perhaps for different reasons). Constitutional review remains a largely unresolved political issue in Canada and it is further complicated by the fact that, of the eleven first ministers who began a process of review through Constitutional Conferences in 1968, only two remain in office in 1972.

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES

Section 17 of the BNA Act determines that

There shall be One Parliament for Canada, consisting of the Queen, an Upper House styled the Senate, and the House of Commons.⁸

The role of the monarch in the Canadian system is exercised in her absence by her Canadian representatives (the Governor-General at the federal level; the Lieutenant Governors provincially). As is the case in all constitutional monarchies, the role of the Crown has become divided, with the Cabinet acting as the efficient executive and the Governor-General acting almost exclusively as a symbolic figurehead. The qualifying “almost” results from the role which the Governor must play in selecting the Prime Minister (although by the conventions of responsible government his choice will be someone whose administration can command the support of a majority of the members of the House of Commons). In addition the Governor may act as an adviser to the Cabinet or to the Prime Minister and has, in Walter Bagehot's classic phrase, “the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn.”⁹

The upper house, styled “the Senate,” much more closely resembles the British House of Lords in power and functions than it does the United States Senate. Senators are appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister and serve to age 75, although Senators appointed before 1965 may serve for life. It was intended that the Senate should reflect the diverse regional interests of Canada; accordingly, 24 Senators are selected from each of the provinces of Ontario and Quebec; 24 are chosen from the western provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia (6 from each); and 24 come from the Maritime provinces of Nova Scotia (10), New Brunswick (10) and Prince Edward Island (4). Six additional Senators from Newfoundland make up the normal complement of 102.

All legislation must pass both houses of Parliament, but tax and appropriation bills must be introduced in the House of Commons and it is not at all clear whether the Senate has the right to amend such legislation.¹⁰ From time to time, governments have promised to reform the Senate so that it could play a more meaningful legislative role; however, to date no government has found it necessary or desirable to

⁵ An example is the Dominion Act of 1875 which created the Supreme Court of Canada.

⁶ See, for example, A. Cairns, “The Judicial Committee and its Critics,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, IV (3), September, 1971, 301–345; M. Fletcher, “Judicial Review and the Division of Powers in Canada,” in J. P. Meekison, *op. cit.*, pp. 166–185; and articles by Cairns and Meekison also in the Meekison volume.

⁷ Some of the arguments against the entrenchment of a Bill of Rights, for example, are offered in D. V. Smiley, “The Case Against the Canadian Charter of Human Rights,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, II (3), September, 1969, 277–291.

⁸ British North American Act, 1867, IV (17).

⁹ Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (London, 1872; 1908 printing), p. 143.

¹⁰ Dawson and Ward point out that the Senate frequently has amended money bills but that the Commons, in accepting such amendments, has contended that such amendments are not to be taken as precedents. Apart from these formal amendments, the Senate's control of financial matters is negligible. Dawson, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

carry out this promise. The Trudeau administration has included Senate reform in the package of changes to be considered under the heading of constitutional review, but the Senate's principal function in the meantime remains a means of honoring (through appointment) faithful servants of the party in power. Defenders of the upper house argue that it can relieve the Commons of part of its legislative burden by considering with greater care, and if necessary amending, legislation drafted hastily and passed quickly through the Commons because of a lengthy calendar of pending business.

In the period immediately after World War II, the Liberal administration was willing to use the Senate for this purpose, and indeed several government bills began their life in the upper house. At that time, the government was involved in the consolidation and overhauling of the bulk of Canada's statutes, and the legislative burden was large. When the Conservative party came to power in 1957, it was faced with a Senate which had become heavily Liberal while that party held the Government from 1935 to 1957; accordingly, the Conservatives were more reluctant to rely on the Senate for assistance. Indeed, the Senate's Liberal majority embarrassed John Diefenbaker's administration substantially at one point by providing a forum in Senate committee hearings for the Governor of the Bank of Canada whose resignation had been requested by the Diefenbaker Cabinet; the Senate further refused to pass a bill declaring the office vacant when the resignation was not forthcoming.

In recent years, Cabinets have preferred to deal with legislative overload through a streamlining of Commons procedures rather than through a reliance on Senate aid. The Senate role with respect to public bills has thus become minimal, although the Senate now acts as the principal body in dealing with private bills.¹¹

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

The lower house of the Canadian Parliament—the Commons—is the body in which the Cabinet's legislation is given its most detailed public scrutiny and in which the Opposition parties have the clearest opportunity to carry on their campaign to convince the public of their suitability as alternatives to the government of the day. The House of Commons is the popularly elected house; it is the body whose sup-

port determines the tenure of the administration; it is the place where most government bills and all money bills are introduced; and it is the chamber in which most members of the Cabinet sit.¹²

The members of the House of Commons are elected on a simple plurality basis from single-member constituencies. Constituency boundaries are now drawn by independent commissions to be established in each province after each decennial census, although prior to the last redistribution in 1966, boundaries had been drawn by parliamentary committee, and prior to 1903, redistribution was by government bill. The present House contains 264 members; 162 sit for constituencies in Ontario or Quebec; 68 sit for the four western provinces; 32 sit for the four Atlantic provinces; and there are 2 members from the Yukon and Northwest Territories. A province's quota of seats is based on its share of the total population; the basic quota of 261 seats is divided in this manner, and the territories' two seats are added to make 263. No province may have fewer seats in the Commons than it has Senators; no province may have fewer seats than a less populous province; and no province may have its representation reduced by more than 15 per cent of what it was entitled to at the last previous redistribution. These rules may add extra seats—hence the current total of 264.¹³

It cannot really be argued that each member of the Commons is an independent legislator, since the parliamentary system depends for its efficient operation on strong party cohesion. Almost all legislation that makes its way through the stages necessary for passage is drafted initially in the Cabinet, although private members' bills which fail to proceed may be adopted in modified fashion by later governments. The control by the Cabinet of the legislative schedule of the House is sometimes attacked as an unnecessary downgrading of Parliament's function; the Commons, it is asserted, has become little more than a rubber stamp in situations of majority government. Even when the governing party has a minority of members in the House (a constant possibility in a multiparty system), members of the Opposition may be reluctant to defeat a government bill since defeat will normally mean an expensive election campaign. This threat is of course more salient for minor parties.

Parliament perhaps functions most importantly as a forum where public issues can be debated and government legislation can be held up to public scrutiny. Government bills are occasionally withdrawn, and they are often amended. Even legislation which passes may be so thoroughly discredited that the party which formulated it is defeated at a subsequent election. However, the time necessary to draw public attention to a bill before the House is often so great that the Opposition is accused of obstructing badly needed programs, and recent administrations have

¹¹ See Dawson, *op. cit.*, p. 297. Private bills are those which relate to a particular locality or to the rights or liabilities of a particular person or body of persons.

¹² Some Cabinets have included a number of Senators, but in recent years the practice has become less common. The only Senator in the present Cabinet is the Government leader in the Senate, Paul Martin.

¹³ For a fuller review of redistribution in Canada see W. E. Lyons, *One Man—One Vote* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970); Norman Ward, "A Century of Constituencies," in Frederick Vaughan *et al.* (eds.), *Contemporary Issues in Canadian Politics* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

had some success in convincing the public that what is needed is a streamlining of Commons procedures to facilitate the rapid passage of laws. Between 1966 and 1969, the rules and procedures of the Commons were substantially revised, and changes were made in rules for limiting debate, the allocation of time for private members' bills, and the means for dealing with the Cabinet's budget and tax proposals.

In many ways the activity of the Commons is less significant for its detailed consideration of legislation than for its exposure to public view of the style of operation and general public policy of the contending parties. The Cabinet's program is outlined each session in a Speech from the Throne; its departmental spending estimates must come before Parliament each fiscal year; and its Budget (a review of the state of the economy as well as tax proposals) is also placed before the Houses of Parliament at least once each fiscal year. It is on these occasions that the Opposition gets its clearest shot at the administration. Twenty-five days are set aside in which the Opposition alone can make motions on any subject falling within the competence of Parliament; and a specified number of these motions may express non-confidence in the Government. Finally, specific legislative proposals must receive three readings in each House and opportunities are provided for discussion of bills in principle (at Second Reading) and in detail (when referred to a committee of the House and when reported for Third Reading).

Perhaps the most entertaining means the Opposition has to embarrass the government is the daily question period in which oral questions about any aspect of government administration may be addressed to the responsible Minister of the Crown. He must give some answer, and consistent evasion will presumably soon attract public attention.

The provinces, it should be noted, all have unicameral legislatures which operate along the lines of the Commons, although some are elected from multi-member constituencies. Municipal government in Canada is under the control of the provincial legislatures, and partisan politics at the municipal level is extremely rare.

Despite all the opportunities provided by the rules

for the Opposition to scrutinize and delay government action, members of the Opposition still regularly complain that Parliament is being hamstrung by rule revisions which provide for the more rapid passage of the Cabinet's legislative program. Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau in particular has been attacked for his "contemptuous" attitude toward Parliament, and the suggestion has been made that the growth of the Prime Minister's office since Trudeau's accession to power is a reflection of the "presidentializing" of a parliamentary office.¹⁴ The Prime Minister, his critics argue, can circumvent the normal checks of party, Cabinet and Opposition by appealing directly to a relatively unsophisticated public on the basis of personal popularity. The collective responsibility of a Cabinet to Parliament has become transformed into the personal and individual responsibility of the Prime Minister to his public—a nearly presidential situation. Canadian political scientists, who long concerned themselves with the balance of power between the federal and provincial governments, have only recently been attentive to the relative power of the Prime Minister, Cabinet and Parliament, and it is only within the last 20 years that they have begun systematically to examine the power of less formal institutions—the mass media, the government bureaucracy, political parties, and interest groups.

The federal general election of 1945 saw four major parties elected to the Commons. The Liberal party, a broad center coalition of interests led by W. I. M. King, captured 125 of the 245 seats and held a majority of seats from 5 of the 10 provinces. The Progressive-Conservatives held 67 seats, of which 48 were in Ontario, the only province in which the Conservatives had a majority.

The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation held 28 seats, 18 of which were from Saskatchewan. The CCF had been formed in the early 1930's as a coalition of labor and farmer groups together with socialists from Ontario, B.C., and Manitoba.¹⁵ It had captured the provincial government of Saskatchewan in 1944 and became the official Opposition in Ontario in 1943; in the latter year it had held 20 per cent of the national public's support in a Gallup poll which placed the Liberals and P.C.'s tied at 28 per cent each. It was outflanked by Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King's social reforms throughout the war years, and by 1945 it had declined to around 16 per cent of the popular vote.

The Social Credit League held 13 seats, all from Alberta. Both the CCF and Social Credit movements had evolved in the 1930's from the remnants of the Progressives, a coalition of farmers' parties which had arisen in the Canadian west during the 1920's in response to perceived eastern control of the economy and Liberal provincial corruption.¹⁶ The Progressives had captured 64 of the Commons' 235 seats in

¹⁴ For a discussion of this question see articles by Denis Smith and Joseph Wearing in T. Hockin (ed.), *Apex of Power* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 224-260. Of interest in this regard is Trudeau's remark that opposition members are "just nobodys" when they are "fifty yards from Parliament hill."

¹⁵ See S. M. Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism*, 2nd edition (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968); Walter Young, *Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969); and K. McNaught, *A Prophet in Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959).

¹⁶ See J. A. Irving, *The Social Credit Movement in Alberta* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959); C. B. Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta*, 2nd edition, 1962 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953); and W. L. Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950).

1921, compared to the Conservatives' 50. Because the Progressives saw themselves not as a party but as a coalition of non-partisan individuals, they declined to become the official Opposition. By 1930, they had lost all but 12 of their seats and the Conservatives had re-emerged as a major party and had taken control of the government. Social Credit had arisen as a non-socialist alternative to the CCF; an agrarian party based on the rather strange monetary doctrines of the English economist Major Douglas, its appeal lay chiefly in the almost charismatic leadership of fundamentalist preacher William Aberhart. Aberhart had led Social Credit to power in Alberta in 1935, and the party was to hold the government of that province until 1971.

In the years following the war, both the old major parties changed leaders, but the Liberals' Louis St. Laurent was able to maintain the party's pre-eminence through the elections of 1949 and 1953. The Conservatives' George Drew gave way in 1956 to John Diefenbaker, whom he had defeated for the PC leadership a scant eight years before.

In 1957, the Progressive-Conservatives came to power federally for the first time since 1935. They succeeded primarily because of a widespread feeling that the Liberals had developed a contempt for Parliament and the democratic process during their long tenure in office. The arrogance of the Liberal Cabinet had become most evident in its use of closure to pass a bill establishing a Crown Corporation to build a natural gas pipeline. In the debate on the bill, one Liberal Cabinet minister is reported to have replied to Opposition criticism with the rhetorical question, "Who's to stop us?"

Since the military conscription crisis of 1917, the Conservatives had found substantial difficulty in attracting the support of French Canada. They had become identified during the 1930's and 1940's as the party of an urban, commercial-industrial, pro-British elite, mainly centered in Ontario. However, Diefenbaker's roots were in western Canada, and he had long had a commitment to broadening the ethnic and regional base of the party's support. In 1958, his minority government was forced to go to the polls, and Diefenbaker received the largest majority ever accorded a Canadian Prime Minister, including 50 seats from the province of Quebec. The CCF were reduced to 8 seats; Social Credit was eliminated from the House.

Between 1958 and 1962, disenchantment began to take hold. The government's handling of the economy, particularly its devaluation of the Canadian dollar, appeared clumsy. The last previous Conservative Prime Minister had been R. B. Bennett, who had come to power at the beginning of the great Depression in 1930; now the Conservatives had returned to power only to face the first major setback to the

post-war boom—the recession of 1957–1960. In the election of 1962, Diefenbaker retained his hold on the west; even Ontario did not completely desert him; however, from the heights of his victory in 1958, he returned to the minority situation he had faced before that election.

In the meantime, the CCF had been disturbed by the fact that it had failed to capture the imagination of the Canadian people, despite a substantial revision of its founding principles (as expressed in the Regina Manifesto of 1933). The revision was presented to a convention of the party in 1956 and approved as the Winnipeg Declaration. Nonetheless, the CCF had gone from 15.6 per cent of the vote in 1945 to 9.5 per cent in 1958 and from 28 seats to 8. In 1961, the CCF merged with the political arm of the Canadian Labor Congress, thereby strengthening its fund-raising possibilities but also alienating a number of possible supporters by its links to organized labor. The new group took the name "New Democratic party."

In the election of 1962, Social Credit made a surprising breakthrough in the province of Quebec. When the Socreds had last appeared in the House of Commons, they had held 19 seats—all from Alberta and British Columbia (British Columbia had gone Social Credit provincially in 1952). In 1962, they gained 30 seats, 26 from Quebec. By September, 1963, the Quebec Social Credit leader had broken with the national party and had formed the Ralliement des Cr ditistes, and the Commons had five parties.

In April, 1963, the national discontent with the Conservatives had come to a head and Lester Pearson, who had led the Liberals since 1958, became Prime Minister and leader of yet another minority government. Control of nuclear weapons, unemployment, Quebec, stable government—all these may be cited as issues on which the Conservative government crumbled, but in the last analysis it was the leadership image and style of John Diefenbaker which had carried the Tories to office in 1957, and it was the deterioration of that image and style which sent them back into the political wilderness in 1963.

The 1965 election did little to change the political balance in the House of Commons. The party leaders had not changed, and although a major issue of the election was the necessity of majority government, Pearson was once again returned with a minority of
(Continued on page 214)

Robert J. Drummond's main interests include Canadian politics, political parties, and electoral behavior, and he is currently working on his doctoral dissertation for Northwestern University on party identification in Ontario. He is assistant to the English-language editor of the *Canadian Journal of Political Science* and a member of the New Democratic party.

“... it has been suggested, tentatively, that what seems to most distinguish Canada from other economic systems are those features that link Canada to the United States economic system. Not only does the United States affect Canadian economic system performance, but the influence of the ‘colossus of the south’ also appears in the economic goals of the Canadian economy....”

The Canadian Economy

BY DAVID J. FALCONE

Lecturer in Political Science, Carleton University

IN THE VARIOUS FORMS in which pedestrian observations that contain more than a grain of truth become popular, Canada has been described as an “arctic banana republic” and “the richest underdeveloped nation in the world.”¹ To gain a

¹ My initial confrontation with these descriptions was on the walls of the tunnels at Carleton University. More readily available sources describing Canada in this fashion are: Roy L. Wolfe, “Economic Development,” in John Warkentin (ed.), *Canada: A Geographical Interpretation* (Toronto: Methuen, 1968), p. 187, and Kari Levitt, *Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970), p. 127.

² Canada's rank with respect to GNP per capita in 1967 U. S. dollar prices is presented here as a datum from a survey of a representative sample collected by the U. S. Agency for International Development. See Gordon F. Boreham and Richard Leftwich, *Economic Thinking in a Canadian Context* (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 752.

³ Economic Council of Canada, *Performance in Perspective* (Ottawa: Information Canada, October, 1971), p. 8.

⁴ Speech to the Washington Press Club, March 25, 1969. Cited in R. J. Van Loon and M. S. Whittington, *The Canadian Political System* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1971).

⁵ During the period 1950–1965, exports ranged from nineteen to twenty-four per cent of GNE. O. J. Firestone, *Problems of Economic Growth* (Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 1968), pp. 56 and 91. For 1970 the figure is 24.8 per cent for exports as a percentage of GNE at market prices and 27 per cent in 1961 dollars. These percentages are based on data in the *National Income and Expenditure Accounts, Third Quarter 1971* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada), pp. 34 and 45. The Economic Council of Canada is referring to the 1960's as a decade of “export-led growth.” *Performance in Perspective*, p. 37.

⁶ Preliminary estimates for 1971 indicate that, although there was again a surplus on current account, there was a marked downward trend throughout that year. For the last quarter, Canada posted a seasonably adjusted deficit of \$188 million compared with a third quarter surplus of \$19 million. Statistics Canada, *Balance of Payments*, February, 1972.

⁷ In 1965 the Automotive Agreement went into effect which permits relatively free trade in automotive products between Canada and the United States. Qualifications to this statement may be found in Hyman Solomon, “U.S. Likely to Seek Relaxation of Terms Protecting Canada,” *FP*, March 28, 1970, but, generally, it is assumed that the agreement has been responsible in large part for the fact that Canada now has balanced a formerly large deficit on automotive products.

measure of the richness of this highly urbanized, industrialized country, we need only glance at a few aggregate indicators. Canada has the third highest gross national product per capita in the world,² the fourth highest growth rate for the last decade among nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Area,³ and only the United States has achieved a higher level of output per person employed. Moreover, in overall trade in absolute terms, this “arctic banana republic” was the world's sixth largest trading partner in 1962.

At the outset, mention should be made of some aspects of the unique and, to many, the disturbing relationship between the Canadian and the United States economic system. Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau probably summarized Canada's status in this relationship most succinctly in a well known simile. He suggested that “sharing a continent with the United States is rather like sleeping with an elephant—he may not know you're there, but you must be sensitive to his every twitch.”⁴

Virtually all Canadian economics textbooks devote considerable space to the consequences of these past and hypothesized “twitchings.”

Exports usually have made up a significant proportion of gross national expenditures and exports to the United States are an overwhelming proportion of total exports (70.7 per cent in 1969). In 1970, Canada registered her first overall balance of payments surplus on the total current account since 1952. This was due partly to an increase in the merchandise trade surplus which, in turn, was attributable to increased exports to the United States.⁵ However, what does not augur well for Canada in these trends is that, although she is mainly a primary goods exporter, the increased strength in Canada's exports to the United States in the late 1960's stemmed largely from increases in exports of highly manufactured⁷

products, chiefly automotive products, and Canada has no "comparative advantage" in this area vis-à-vis the United States.

In light of these facts, and the fact that (as the New Economic Policy portends) the United States probably no longer will let her alleged paternalism override her concern for economic health, it is understandable that External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp recently implored Canadians to "pray every morning and evening that the U.S. economy will continue to prosper."⁸ Canadian reactions to President Richard Nixon's announcement of some of the details of the New Economic Policy on August 15, 1971, further clarified the extreme sensitivity of the Canadian economy to the vicissitudes of United States policy. For example, the government proposed employment support legislation that appropriated \$80 million to help prevent layoffs in industries most affected by the surcharge; the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce set up an information bureau to answer questions of private businessmen; General Motors of Canada Ltd. announced a layoff of 2,000 in five plants; the Aluminum Company of Canada and some lumber products industries also announced layoffs. These layoffs all were blamed on the Nixon policy.⁹

Estimates of the short-term impact of the Nixon policy varied widely but Industry, Trade and Commerce eventually decided that approximately \$2.7-billion worth of exports would be affected and about \$500 million worth would be affected seriously. The

total cost in employment was expected to be between 20,000 and 30,000 jobs.¹⁰

A second indicator of Canada's "dependent" status, and one that has excited the most controversy, is the extent of foreign investment in Canada and, relatedly, the degree to which foreigners own and/or control resident industry. Since Confederation, Canada has imported substantial amounts of capital. By 1926, the United States had supplanted Great Britain as the principal creditor and by 1965 United States investment accounted for 79 per cent of total foreign investment in Canada.¹¹ However, the sheer volume of foreign capital invested in Canada is not the primary cause for concern of those persons often referred to collectively—and with considerable oversimplification—as "economic nationalists." More important is the fact that since 1952 over one-half of Canadian long-term indebtedness has been direct investment.¹²

What this means is that given the premise that there will be no radical alteration in Canada's historical situation with respect to balance of payments on current account, she could only "buy Canada back" by additional foreign borrowing. Therefore, it is highly unlikely, *ceteris paribus*, that the extent of non-resident control of Canadian industry in 1963 (60 per cent of manufacturing, 74 per cent of petroleum and natural gas, and 59 per cent of mining and smelting) noted in the Watkins Report will decrease significantly for some time to come.¹³ It is small wonder, then, that many Canadians, faced with the recent United States legislation setting up the Domestic International Sales Corporation, have rotated the foreign investment problem to the point where a new facet has come into view and a new emphasis has assumed importance. In this view, American economic "imperialism" seemingly has capitulated to "irresponsible isolationism" and even Mel Watkins, who argued for the establishment of the Canada Development Corporation (now being launched into operation at glacial speed and with suitably ambiguous terms of reference)¹⁴ must sense this institution's inefficacy as a counterforce.¹⁵

This brief description of Canada's special relationship with the United States should be sufficient to suggest why Canada's wealth might be regarded as somewhat of an embarrassment of riches. Also, we have sketched a situation that compounds the irony in the depiction of Canada as rich and underdeveloped—"that Canada exists at all is the supreme paradox."¹⁶

At a fairly high level of abstraction, there seems to be some agreement in advanced economies on several objectives. From a survey of the stated economic policies of eight European countries and the United States, E. S. Kirschen *et al.* delineated several shared goals.¹⁷

The shared relatively short-term objectives are

⁸ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, January 18, 1972, p. 1.

⁹ If the layoffs in fact were owing to conditions obtaining before the Nixon policy was announced, it still seems significant that the Nixon policy could have provided the "excuse."

¹⁰ The total Canadian labor force in 1970 was about 8.4 million.

¹¹ Levitt, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-69. Despite the fact that Levitt's interpretations of the data may be overextended somewhat at times, her data are conservative estimates of direct American investment. Hyman Solomon, "U.S. Stake in Canada Bigger Than We Think," *FP*, August 14, 1971, p. 1 shows that figures on direct investment compiled by the U.S. Commerce Department's Office of Foreign Direct Investment are substantially higher than those reported by Statistics Canada owing to differences in definitions of ownership.

¹² See, for example, Levitt, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

¹³ *Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), p. 422.

¹⁴ When the task of an organization is well known to be to buy back Canada, it might be best that its official terms of reference be stated, not only broadly, but ambiguously. A discussion of what the CDC actually will do is the topic of an article in the *FP*, December 4, 1971, p. 1.

¹⁵ Muriel Armstrong's *The Canadian Economy and Its Problems* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 229, is one of the few treatments of the subject that point out that the Watkins Report did not advocate the CDC as a means of repatriating existing industries. Another is A. E. Safarian, "Benefits and Costs of Foreign Investment," in L. H. Officer and L. B. Smith (eds.), *Canadian Economic Problems and Policies* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), pp. 121-125.

¹⁶ Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

¹⁷ E. S. Kirschen *et al.*, *Economic Policy in Our Time* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1964), vol. 1. The European countries surveyed were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway.

full employment, price stability and improvements in the balance of payments. The long-term objectives are expansion of production, improvement in the allocation of factors of production, the satisfaction of collective needs and improvement in the distribution of incomes and wealth. In general, this list is similar to the objectives outlined for Canada by the Economic Council¹⁸ but particular differences may be revealing. One overall difference between the list of objectives culled from the nine-nation study and the list of those the Council posits is that all five of the latter—full employment, reasonable stability of prices, a viable balance of payments, growth, and an equitable distribution of incomes—are offered as “medium-term” objectives. Of the many plausible assumptions that could explain this discrepancy, we will use as a working hypothesis the assumption that the Council’s weighting of stabilization objectives reflects the “openness” of the Canadian economy.

However, the assertion that the Canadian economy is open should not be made without some qualification. In addition to the “dependence” of the Canadian economy mentioned above, the assertion rests upon such claims as the fact that, in 1964, the Canadian average of exports and imports as a function of GNP (.23) was higher than analogous figures for the United Kingdom (.20), West Germany (.19), Italy (.17), France (.14), Japan (.12), and the United States (.05); exports usually have amounted to one-half the output of goods-producing Canadian industries and imports normally have accounted for one-half of consumption expenditures; Canada undertook the removal of trade and exchange restrictions after World War II much earlier than most other coun-

tries;¹⁹ the Canadian dollar since 1970 and for most of the post-war years has had a floating exchange rate (1950–1962); a reliance on primary commodities makes the Canadian economy extremely sensitive; and for almost all post-war years until 1970 Canada has had a net national indebtedness fluctuating only in the magnitude of the figure following the minus sign.

The arguments that Canada is not open could be based on the fact that Austria, the Benelux and Scandinavian countries all have higher foreign trade to GNP ratios than does Canada; “Canadian trade duties in several trade sectors are sufficiently high for this country to be regarded now as having a relatively high tariff, at least among the more industrially advanced nations;²⁰ and, despite some trade agreements such as the Defense Production Sharing Agreement and the Automotive Agreement with the United States, Canada is one of the few countries without a duty-free foreign market for manufactured products.

Without too much distortion of these two positions we can forge a compromise between them. That is, the Canadian economy is open but only relative to other large industrially advanced economies and only insofar as flows to and from the United States are concerned. We have argued that the volume and importance of the interchanges in this relationship are not balanced. The degree to which they are not balanced is a rough measure of the degree to which Canada’s interdependence can be described more appropriately as dependence.

Economists like H. E. English who maintain that balance-of-payments fluctuations are mere epiphenomena—that they reflect the underlying health or malaise of an economy but do not have any independent causal force—may be correct from certain standpoints.²¹ But, it is plausible that in the Canadian case, the symptoms take on a causal efficacy of their own.

THE UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM

The other stabilization goals are full employment and a reasonable stability of prices. Full employment has meant 97 per cent employment, but trade-offs between reasonable price increases and unemployment and the necessity of improving the growth rate have pulled this figure down to 96.2 per cent. The target for price increases has been between 1.4 and 2.0 per cent.²²

Recently, unemployment figures have been more off target than have price indices. The former have followed roughly the same patterns as have unemployment trends in the United States, starting the decade considerably above the United States rates, converging around the mid-1960’s, and eventually moving above the United States figures. In 1970, although seller’s inflation is hardly unknown in Canada, the

¹⁸ The Economic Council of Canada is a quasi-bureaucratic agency established by Parliament in 1963 as an alternative to the bureaucracy as a source of information and, to some extent, as an alternative source of direction in long term policy formulation. Obviously, the Council’s objectives are not “authoritative” in the pristine sense of the term. However, they are those objectives most often referred to when the performance of the economy is being assessed. One of the reasons the Council’s pronouncements are not “official,” is that economic “counciling” is federalized and regionalized in Canada. In addition to provincial economic councils, there is an Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, for example. Albert Breton argues that the Council’s ascribed “planning” function is, in actuality, a “blocking” function. See “A Theory of the Economic Council of Canada,” in L. H. Officer and L. B. Smith (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 93–102. For our purpose, the utility of the objectives posited by the Council does not depend upon the validity of Breton’s argument. Nevertheless, for a view of the Council’s functions that is in contrast to Breton’s see H. E. English, “Economic Planning in Canada,” in T. N. Brewis *et al.*, *Canada’s Economic Policy*, rev. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 358–375.

¹⁹ Bernard Goodman, *Two Dependent Economies* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1964), p. 13. Also see H. E. English, “Canada’s International Economic Policy,” in T. N. Brewis *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 148–149.

²⁰ E.C.C., *Seventh Annual Review*, p. 74.

²¹ English, *op. cit.*

²² Consult the various annual reviews for successive revisions of these figures.

rate of increase in price indexes and the unemployment rate were in classic relation.²³

The unemployment problem in Canada is accentuated, as it is in most countries, by the fact that high unemployment currently is occurring in conjunction with a tight labor market, complicating the difficulties involved in absorbing new entrants into the labor force. Moreover, in Canada, perhaps to a greater extent than in most other countries, unemployment rates vary widely by region.²⁴ In 1968, for example, unemployment ranged from 7.3 per cent in the Atlantic region to 2.9 per cent in the Prairies. The regional disparities in structural unemployment are another possible explanation for the fact that stabilization goals are viewed as relatively long-term in Canada.

Again, what also differentiates the Canadian economy from others is the comparative sensitivity of Canadian price and employment variables to fibrillations in the United States economy.

The productivity of factor inputs also must be considered in assessing Canada's economy in light of the objective of economic growth. This objective includes expansion of production and improvement in the allocation of the factors of production, goals that are discrete in the review of Kirschen *et al.* The Council's collapsing of these objectives into one might suggest that expansion of production, allocation of the factors of production, and growth are intertwined in Canada to an even greater extent than they are in other Western economies.²⁵

If Canada is either unwilling or unable to achieve growth through international indebtedness, then *quantitative* increases in the labor force such as a higher proportion of working women, immigration, and the late increases traceable to the baby boom of World War II must be accompanied by significant *qualitative* increases in this force. Also, it is unlikely that Canada will narrow her growth gap without corresponding increases in the contribution of domestic capital to national output as well. The former governor of the Bank of Canada may have presaged the Council's analysis of current political and economic realities when he ventured the notorious claim that Canadians were living beyond their means.

²³ For comparative figures see *Performance in Perspective*, pp. 10 and 11.

²⁴ See T. N. Brewis, "The Problem of Regional Disparities," in W. D. Wood and R. S. Thoman (eds.), *Areas of Economic Stress in Canada* (Kingston, Ontario: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1965), pp. 99-113 and ECC, *Fifth Annual Review* (1968), pp. 170-179.

²⁵ W. T. Easterbrook and Hugh G. J. Aitken, *Canadian Economic History* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 573ff. concluded that Canadian savings since World War II were almost enough to finance her growth in productive capacity. Domestic savings financed about 75 per cent of gross capital formation from 1946-1958 versus about 50 per cent in 1929-30. The authors suggested several reasons why the savings that were generated were not being used to finance domestic investment; Canada has been a significant exporter of capital, and a considerable proportion of Canadian savings went to the retirement of debts abroad.

THE PRODUCTIVITY GAP

Given the importance of the "efficiency" of factor inputs in the economic growth of a relatively independent Canada, at least brief mention should be made here of some explanations for the productivity gap that exists, both between potential and actual productivity and between the efficiency of factor inputs in Canada and the United States. One that can be dismissed fairly easily is the argument that Canadians, being "more conservative and less aggressive than people in other countries," are not charged with the "economic aggressiveness and . . . unabashed materialism" that typifies Americans and makes them good entrepreneurs. As a matter of fact, data from a recent study by Clive Baxter indicate that, although there is a smaller proportion of Canadians than Americans with incomes over \$10,000 per year (.07 vs. .25), within this income category, dividend income from stocks was a more important source of investment income for Canadians than for Americans with the exception of the group that is earning \$10,000 to \$25,000 per year.

Other explanations for the relative inefficiency of Canadian factor inputs cannot be dispensed with so handily. Among these explanations are: that effective tariffs foster inefficiency by the protection they provide; that Canada's aggregate demand is too small to promote efficiency in production, given the diversity of goods that Canadians demand; that American subsidiaries are not profit maximizers, hence they are not efficiency oriented to the same extent as are their parent firms; that Americans are more educated than Canadians and their education is more pragmatic; and that the labor force is relatively immobile, particularly in certain regions.

Regardless of the extent to which her growth has been achieved at the sacrifice of her independence (or what might have been her independence), Canada has an impressive per capita income and an impressive real growth rate. Earlier we mentioned these data as indices of "development." Actually, they are merely measures of growth.

There are at least two stains on the Canadian record with respect to progress toward equitable income distribution. First, there is the fact that regional disparities in per capita income are unusually pronounced in Canada. (In 1964, per capita income ranged from \$1,081 in Newfoundland to \$2,153 in Ontario.) But more important than the mere fact of regional disparities in real income is the fact that, despite sweeping measures on the part of the federal government to reduce these disparities, there has been virtually no convergence in the regional figures toward the national average since 1929. This record does not compare favorably with that of the United States where some convergence has taken place.

The second troubling characteristic of income dis-

tribution in Canada is that 25 per cent of the population lives in poverty.²⁶ In its *Fifth Annual Review* (1968) the Economic Council began an analysis of this problem with an invective that deserves quotation:

Poverty in Canada is real. Its numbers are not in the thousands, but the millions. There is more of it than our society can tolerate, more than our economy can afford, and far more than existing measures and efforts can cope with. Its persistence, at a time when the bulk of Canadians enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the world, is a disgrace.

There is now a voluminous and growing literature on the subject of poverty in Canada.²⁷ Before leaving the subject of Canadian goals, however, perhaps we should note that, although poverty obviously is not uniquely Canadian, there are virtually no systematic cross-national, comparative studies of the poverty problem in recent Canadian government or research organization publications.

In a more substantive vein, perhaps it should also be mentioned at this juncture that independence from the United States would undoubtedly heighten Canada's poverty problem, at least insofar as poverty is measured by relatively "objective" standards.

UNMENTIONED GOALS

The Economic Council's specification of objectives deserves attention for what are possibly significant omissions, as well as for the modifications of the objectives listed by Kirschen *et al.* Two of the most conspicuous omissions are an objective dealing explicitly with the satisfaction of collective needs, and an objective of economic independence such as is posited in the well-known work of Kenneth Boulding.²⁸

The absence of a goal of economic independence is understandable in light of the previous discussion. Mel Watkins has made "extraterritoriality" a dormitory, if not a household, word. In brief, the term applies to the imposition of American law and/or policy on American subsidiaries either through "moral persuasion" or legal force. There are numerous instances of such impositions, some of which seem to contravene Canada's economic interest. The

United States policies that precipitated the exchange rate crisis of 1968, in which corporations were directed to control their subsidiaries in such a way as to improve the balance of payments, are one example. More often cited in this regard, however, is the Trading with the Enemy Act from which Canadian subsidiaries were exempted in 1970. The act supposedly was a potential barrier to Canada's trade with what was then Red China. It is somewhat surprising that "economic nationalists" so often cite the Trading with the Enemy Act as a prime example of United States interference, since they often contend that subsidiaries do not tend to export to a significant degree.

The crisis of 1968 and perhaps the crisis of 1971, however, were economic realities pointing up the effect that United States policy could have on the Canadian economy, not simply via trade policies and international monetary policies that affect the rest of the world as well, but through direct influences on a massive portion of Canada's resident capital and industry. It is unnecessary further to belabor this point. The fact that, at present, United States long-term investment in Canada is over 45 per cent of Canada's GNP at market prices and the fact that its activities are subject to the discretion of the United States Treasury operating under an all too predictable New Economic Policy impart their own significance to a discussion of Canadian economic independence.

The lack of an objective specifying the satisfaction of collective needs probably simply reflects the fact that Canada, in Richard Musgrave's typology, has a "modern capitalist" rather than a "liberal socialist" or "classical capitalist" economy.²⁹ In comparison with the latter type, the satisfaction of "merit wants" is less a factor in government direction of the private sector in Canada. To be oversimplistic in grandiose fashion, the corporate, organic and collectivist strains bequeathed to Canada by Britain and supposedly embodied in the "ideologies" of the New Democratic party and the Progressive Conservative party³⁰ have not been evidenced in the material policy of the Canadian system.

With respect to factors in Musgrave's typology that distinguish economic systems according to structure, two would discriminate among Western economies. One of these factors is the extent to which government determines the proportion of national output directed into capital formation. The other is the proportion of the means of production owned and managed by individuals.

The Canadian economic system is modern capitalist in structure as opposed to classical capitalist. The federal government has at its disposal roughly the same arsenal of inducements and outright controls as does the United States government. Through fiscal, monetary, debt management, exchange rate and bal-

²⁶ This is the figure reported in *The Report of the Special Senate Committee on Poverty* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971). Substantially the same figure, 24.5 per cent, was reported by the ECC in the *Fifth Annual Review*, p. 109.

²⁷ For a bibliography consult Freda Paltiel (ed.), *Poverty* (Ottawa: Canadian Welfare Council, 1966). A more recent bibliography can be found in Van Loon and Whittington, *op. cit.*, pp. 543-44.

²⁸ *Principles of Economic Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958).

²⁹ *Fiscal Systems* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), *passim*.

³⁰ For an imaginative argument that these strains are important in Canadian values see Gad Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada: an Interpretation," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, vol. 32, no. 2 (May, 1966).

ance of payments policies the government, sometimes directly and sometimes through governmental agencies acting as financial intermediaries, can regulate market "imperfections" in conformance with prescribed consumption and investment combinations. Some would argue that at times these stabilizing devices have been used without the necessary coordination provided by Keynesian theory—that Canada has prospered economically in spite of her use of these devices rather than because of them.³¹ Whatever the case, the discretionary policies exist and are used vigorously for ill or good.

One of the barriers to effective governmental direction of capital formation is the fact that there is no relatively unambiguous target figure for savings. The federal government has faced at least three other obstacles in the effective exercise of aggregative regulatory activity. First, it sometimes is contended that (notwithstanding the British heritage argument) there are vestiges of classical liberalism in Canadian culture with respect to the legitimate scope of government in the economy. The evidence on this point is scanty and what data there are can be used to approach the question only in an oblique fashion. However, Mildred Schwartz's analysis of public opinion poll data from 1942 to 1962 does not suggest that vigorous government policies would be antithetical to Canadian attitudes.³² For example, there is nothing near consensus on the inviolability of the private sector as seen in public attitudes toward wage and price controls or toward public ownership and control of industries. Nor do Canadians seem to object strenuously to most of the other items presented them in a series consisting of a broad spectrum of hypothetical and actual examples of government "interference."

The other two barriers to effective governmental direction are more impressive. The first stems from the fact that in Canada, perhaps to a greater extent than in the United States, the pursuit of coherent regulatory activity on the part of the federal government is limited by the decentralized nature of the political system. Second, policy effectiveness is constrained by the necessity of predicting United States behavior with a tolerable degree of accuracy. One of the more memorable fiascos in the post-Keynesian history of Canadian monetary policy, for example, was due largely to the failure to anticipate successfully

the impact of contractionary policy on flows of United States capital. It is true that no Western economy can plan and operate as though it were a completely closed system. Yet in the Canadian case, infusions and withdrawals of foreign capital, particularly United States capital, have been unusually important.

It is more difficult to classify Canada's economy as regards Musgrave's second structural discriminant. Other than institutional descriptions, there is very little information on the extent of government ownership and/or management of the means of production. Even in the most clear-cut instance of government ownership, crown corporations, there are numerous problems in assessing the degree of government management.³³ The extent to which different types of crown corporations are functionally autonomous varies widely. The most patently commercial type of crown corporation defined in the Financial Administration Act, proprietary corporations (including Air Canada, Polymer, The National Railways and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) are required to furnish Parliament with only the sorts of information private corporations are required to divulge. Further, recruitment of personnel is not channeled through the Public Service Commission; proprietary corporations have had to pay corporate income taxes since 1952; and, at least formally, proprietary corporations are expected to operate without government subsidy.

Two evidences of government management (albeit indirect management) are the fact that the directors of some proprietary corporation are appointed by the Governor General and some can be investigated by the Auditor General.

A CONCLUDING NOTE: CANADIAN ECONOMY

In terms of the above selected indices of economic structure, there is little to differentiate the Canadian and American systems, particularly with respect to the economic structures of other Western nations.

What does this mean in terms of system boundaries? It is arguable that a considerable degree of *de facto* economic assimilation already has taken place. This interpretation would carry with it the conclusion that the appearance of separateness is only due to an em-

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David Falcone is conducting a study of the economic and political determinants of provincial government policies. His publications include (with Allan Kornberg and William Mishler) "Socio-economic Changes, Parliamentary Composition and Political System Outputs in Canada: 1867-1968," in Lewis Edinger, Mattei Dogan and Juan Linz (eds.), *Ministerial Elites and Social Structures in Parliamentary Democracies* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1972) and (with Robert Frasure), *Comparative Politics: Problems and Approaches* (Encino, Calif.: Dickenson, 1972).

³¹ For an argument that Keynesian economics have made little or no impact on Canadian economic policy see H. Scott Gordon, "A Twenty Year Perspective: Some Reflections on the Keynesian Revolution in Canada," in *Canadian Economic Policy Since the War* (Ottawa: Canadian Trade Committee, 1965), pp. 23-46.

³² Mildred Schwartz, *Public Opinion and Canadian Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 97-105.

³³ For a detailed description of the role of crown corporations in Canada see G. A. Ashley and R. G. H. Smail, *Canadian Crown Corporations* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965). For a synoptic view see Van Loon and Whittington, *op. cit.*

BOOK REVIEWS

THE BLACKS IN CANADA. BY ROBIN W. WINKS. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. 546 pages and index, \$15.00.)

This well written and detailed volume adds to the growing body of scholarly material on the history of the blacks in North America. Because the black population of Canada has always been small—no more than 2.5 per cent of the Canadian population, or some 100,000 in 1970—the history of the blacks in Canada has not received the attention of historians. This volume traces black history in Canada from 1628 to the 1960's. The author set out to discover something of the nature of prejudice in Canada, the Negro experience in searching for Canadian identity, and the Negro role in Canadian history.

"If the United States was to be likened to a melting pot, whether or not in fact the pot melted . . . Canada was to be likened to a mosaic—and . . . a vertical one at that." In the mosaic, as in the melting pot, the Negro met prejudice: "Prejudice in Canada was not the product of slavery, of fears for job security, of sexual myths, or of any other single factor; it was the product of indifference; the product of a society that was far more hierarchically minded than American society outside the South. . . ." Drawing largely on primary sources, this interesting book offers a great deal of welcome information about black history and Canadian history.

O.E.S.

THE FRAGILE BLOSSOM. CRISIS AND CHANGE IN JAPAN. BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972. 153 pages, \$5.95.)

Disclaiming expertise on Japan, the author spent much time in the past two years traveling and interviewing officials in Japan, Indonesia, Korea and Taiwan. He explored the emerging patterns of political change, inquired into the permanence of Japanese democracy, evaluated the factors giving rise to the rapid economic recovery since the defeat of 1945 and, finally, sought to ascertain Japan's concept of her future global role.

The author observes that Japan is visibly affected by events and attitudes in the outside world. He regards the society as fragile in the sense that national goals and the Japanese sense of values are changing in an atmosphere of anxiety, apprehension and insecurity. These feelings were exacer-

bated when President Richard Nixon's visit to China was announced without prior consultation with Japan, which had viewed herself as an ally of the United States, under the Security Treaty of 1951, revised in 1960. Japan's social consensus may be fragmented as international and economic tensions threaten the "fragile blossom." In the years to come, the left will become a more formidable facet of Japanese life. Internationally, labor shortages and a less favorable image abroad may yield some economic slowdown.

Brzezinski recommends that the United States public pay more attention to Japanese affairs; that Japan be encouraged towards broader involvement in regional and world-wide peace-keeping efforts; and that three-way United States-Japanese-Chinese consultations should be held on economic, political and security matters. He reiterates that Japan is entering world affairs on a massive scale, and that the United States has a vital stake in the outcome.

Willard F. Barber
University of Maryland

ARMS, YEN AND POWER. THE JAPANESE DILEMMA. BY JOHN K. EMMERSON. (New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., 1971. 420 pages, \$15.00.)

Will Okinawa's return to Japanese jurisdiction, and the assurances that all nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from the island, lead the Japanese to reconsider the defense-security responsibilities that they will thereby incur? If the Nixon Doctrine (involving the reduction of the number of American troops in Asia) and a lowering of our profile generally become a reality, will Japan "go nuclear"? Youth groups, pacifists and Socialists have thus far influenced the Japanese government in its 25-year policy of spending not more than one per cent of its gross national product on armaments. There is good reason to doubt that United States land, sea and air forces—and the nuclear umbrella—will be used again very soon in Asian wars. Will Japan remain comparatively defenseless?

The other horn of the dilemma is the rapid and continuing upsurge of Japan's economic growth. Automobiles, plastics, communications and especially the textile industries in the United States have felt the impact. Japan, now the third nation in the world in terms of G.N.P., is the first or second largest trading partner with each of the Asian countries.

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FRENCH AND ENGLISH IN CANADA

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since the early 1960's in such acts of revolutionary violence as bombings, thefts of dynamite and firearms, and armed robberies to finance the movement. It must be recognized that the perpetrators of these outrages have generally been few in number—since they are amateur and casual movements rather than groups of hardened criminals or revolutionaries—and it has been possible for the police to exploit defections and internal quarrels to break up each group without too much difficulty.

SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE

The professed aim of these activities has been symbolic acts of violence to "politicize" a much larger section of the population and to create the appearance of repression by the authorities. Hence the attacks on such "Canadian" symbols as mailboxes and armories, and the attempts to exploit the grievances of ill-organized groups like taxi drivers and striking workers. When these activities have attached themselves to the fringes of more widely felt movements such as unilingualism, "McGill française"—a huge mass march on that symbol of Anglo-Saxon Protestant ascendancy, McGill University, in 1969—or widespread student grievances in overcrowded universities and colleges, they have involved themselves in what appear—at the time at least—to be mass political protests in the streets. There is no doubt that the authorities of the City of Montreal at least had convinced themselves of the imminence of revolutionary violence.

When the police failed so clearly to deal with the kidnappings there was a good deal of panic among the authorities, and a belated attempt to protect the lives of numerous public figures who might (who knew?) be next on the list. There were some prominent members of the business community who were told that adequate protection for them was impossible and that they would do well to move discreetly out of the province. The first move to relieve the harassed police was to employ troops as guards for prominent persons and vulnerable buildings. Then, when the police asserted that they lacked sufficient powers of arrest and detention, emergency measures were taken.

The War Measures Act, which since 1914 has conferred wide powers on the federal government in the event of real or apprehended war or insurrection, was invoked. On October 16, 1970, the Public Order

Regulations, which made it an offense to be a member or supporter of the FLQ and gave the police wide powers of arrest and seizure without warrant, plus what amounted to the power of preventive detention, were proclaimed. In accordance with the law, these regulations were laid before Parliament, and after considerable debate were approved.

The massive response of the federal government was no doubt partly to allay the panic and indecision visible in Montreal. It was partly also an effort to stiffen the resistance of the Quebec government against the demands of the kidnappers (which included the release of "political" prisoners) at a time when it was evident that both the Quebec Cabinet and important sections of opinion in Quebec were leaning to the view that the lives of two men were more important than a sterile and dogmatic defense of law and order. The fact that Pierre Laporte was a friend and associate of so many of them made the situation more agonizing, and the discovery that he had been murdered by his kidnappers must have left many in serious doubt that the decision taken was correct.

The division of jurisdiction over law enforcement which makes the federal Parliament responsible for enacting the criminal law but the provincial attorneys-general and police authorities responsible for its enforcement complicated the situation, for it meant among other things that the federal authorities had no operational control over measures which they themselves had enacted.

A further cause of embarrassment was the fact that a civic election in Montreal took place at the height of the crisis. The only effective opposition to Mayor Jean Drapeau and his Civic party was a loose coalition of labor and community groups called the *Front de l'action politique* (FRAP), some of whose supporters and two of whose candidates were held by police in the first big raids under the emergency regulations. It was not surprising that the mayor and his party profited from the bizarre conditions of the election to sweep back into office in possession of all of the seats on the city council.

The first reaction to the crisis was the observation that the kidnappings had succeeded in Quebec where all other national independence movements had failed. They had polarized Quebec politics, destroyed the moderate center and left right-wing hard-line federalists (and there are such in French Canada) confronting a left wing and equally intransigent independence movement. At the same time, English-speaking Canada had been so disturbed by these events that the climate for a reasonable compromise with French Canadians no longer existed.⁴

Or so it seemed. One of the central difficulties is the Canadian constitution. Like most constitutions which have survived over a century of turbulent life,

⁴ See, among the numerous books written about the crisis, Ron Haggart and Aubrey Golden, *Rumours of War* (Toronto: New Press, 1971), Gerard Pelletier, *La Crise d'Octobre* (Montreal: Editions du Jour, 1971), and Denis Smith, *Bleeding Hearts, Bleeding Country* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1971).

it is in many respects outmoded, and it has become accepted that the only way of operating the federal system is through the connivance of federal and provincial governments by means of cooperation rather than by strict adherence to the division of powers. And yet changes of a formal sort are necessary, not only to clear away archaic provisions, but to recognize modern realities. That one of the major objects of confederation was to provide a framework of accommodation between the two founding races may have been an important factor at the time, but the constitution is almost silent about the issue. Today that silence must be broken, and the constitution must give overt recognition both to the position of the two groups in the union as a whole, and to the special needs of Quebec as the "homeland" where French Canadians are in a secure majority. That is why it must be formally recognized that Quebec is not "a province like the others," although "strict construction" federalists like Prime Minister Trudeau are extremely reluctant to do so. It may be a reflection of the aftereffects of 1970 that the Constitutional Conference of federal and provincial governments at Victoria, British Columbia, failed to reach agreement in June, 1971. The nub of the failure was whether or not Quebec should have ultimate control over social policy within its boundaries.

What of the future? There is almost certain to be a federal election in 1972, and this involves the fate of the Liberal government of Prime Minister Trudeau. Whether the election produces a strong majority government or results, as is possible, in a minority regime in Ottawa will have much to do with the course of events in the next five years. The results of that election are more likely to be affected by high unemployment, exacerbated by the effects of United States trade policy, but what is at issue in the end is the future of Canadian federalism.

It is more than likely that the effect of the FLQ violence in Quebec has been counter-productive, and that Quebec politics cannot so easily be shaken from the current mold. Even the Quebec independence movement is far from monolithic. Its leaders, like their nationalist predecessors, seem still to be engaged in a Sisyphean struggle to activate the electorate in support of the national cause, only to find that it slips by force of habit into divisions of its own which reflect the clash of interest of city against countryside, worker against employer, and so forth.

One problem is the major difference in outlook between the masses and the elites. As sociologist Guy Rocher has pointed out, the intelligentsia who seek to articulate political issues are conditioned by education and the communication links which are most natural to them to see the world around them in categories

borrowed from France itself (the world of *Le Monde*, not of *The New York Times*). But the great mass of the population operates in a culture and life style that is essentially North American, reinforced by radio, television and the informal network of communication generated by the world of entertainment, sport and leisure. The resultant difficulty of communication leads the political elites seriously to misunderstand the scale of values of the people they are leading.⁵ There is some truth—although not enough—to the comfortable feeling of Prime Minister Trudeau and his Cabinet that the Quebec intelligentsia who dominate the press and the other media are talking only to one another.

Even if this were so, it is unlikely to be so in the long run. We do not know as much as we should about the role of the educational system in political socialization, but it can hardly be insignificant. And in Quebec education is at long last spreading to all, and is likely with the decline of religion to displace the church as a socialization device. Within the Quebec school system, it appears that the teachers, who have a militant organization, are strongly influenced by a militant nationalism. This was illustrated by massive demonstrations organized in the winter of 1969–1970 in support of a policy of unilingualism in the schools, which prompted political party leaders to remonstrate at the impropriety of using great demonstrations of schoolchildren—many of whom were very young—led by their teachers, on a public issue of such complexity. And in the following year there were numerous complaints, some of which were substantiated, against teachers using the classroom for political indoctrination. Thus, the next generation of schoolchildren may reach adulthood after heavy indoctrination with the new nationalism at school. The schoolteachers have replaced the clergy as the principal carriers of the social values of the community, and are replacing the old French and Catholic nationalism with a newer and more revolutionary nationalism.

For the political cleavages created by secular nationalism may be far more acute than the cleavages of the past. The traditional cleavages in the Canadian political system as a whole were those of religion rather than of class or ethnicity. Such cleavages were possible to contain within a broadly based party system, partly because the large number of anglophone Catholics caused the cleavage to cut across ethnic lines. And, in any event, religion is not a serious challenge to the legitimacy of a regime, because religions are committed by both history and doctrine to accept the legitimacy of the political regime in which they find themselves. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism, which is more likely to challenge the legitimacy of the regime, is more revolutionary in character.

⁵ "Les Conditions d'une Francophonie Nord-Américaine Originale," *Le Devoir*, 28 décembre, 1971.

The separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada before the end of this century is a real possibility. It is most likely to be avoided by goodwill and a willingness to make accommodations on both sides.⁶ Such accommodation may well be possible, particularly if the sentiment for political separation—as distinct from cultural integrity—is not so strong as sometimes appears. If, as a result of the growing sensitivity to the problem by both business and government agencies, the conditions of work for most French Canadians reduce the culture shock which now confronts so many of them in the predominantly anglophone work world, then the prospects for the survival of the Canadian union are not poor. Professor Erwin Hargrove of Brown University has produced some interesting evidence to suggest that this may be the case. In a study of the attitudes of young French Canadian elites he found that, among his group of professionals, “political nationalism, as such, is not very intense,” but there is an almost overwhelming urge “for fulfillment, for complete development as French-speaking persons in a French-speaking society of its own distinctive culture.”⁷

A country made up of two nations, Canada has survived for over a century as an arranged marriage, without much love, without much intimacy, but with a reasonable degree of accommodation to contain friction. It is now facing the major crisis which, late in life, shakes most human relationships to their foundations.

⁶ The implications of the separation of Quebec, particularly for English-speaking Canadians, have recently been explored in R. M. Burns (ed.), *One Country or Two?* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1971).

⁷ Erwin C. Hargrove, “Nationality, Values, and Change: Young Elites in French Canada,” *Comparative Politics* (April, 1970), p. 498.

CANADIAN NATIONALITY

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Many English Canadians indeed looked to him as a savior of Canada from the threat of separatism, and his action in the proclamation of the War Measures Act seemed to justify their doing so. In constitutional matters Trudeau has proved himself an unshakable upholder of a rigid federalism. But many English Canadians, the New Democratic party for example, and even many conservatives, accept the possibility of the peaceable secession of Quebec through the exercise of the right of self-determination.

In spite of this extraordinarily mild reaction in most of English Canada, English Canada finds itself regarded by French Canadian intellectuals as another “nation” like French Canada, a nation which also might well go its own way. Leaving aside the practical implication of its doing so, this is a profound misunderstanding of “English” Canada, a misunder-

standing which reflects the fact that French Canada neither understands nor has attempted to understand its English partners. The Québécois are themselves an ethnic nation based on language, culture and religion, close knit and possessing a sense of mission (like Americans in this last respect).

English Canada is no such thing. It is an immigrant society, essentially assimilative and accepting (in the once vaunted mosaic principle) the possibility of the cultural survival of ethnic groups, a society assimilating to no preestablished standard (once British but no longer so), but evolving in the process of assimilation. It possesses no unity except that of the territorial state, a common citizenship and a public language, English. English Canada is, in short, a political nationality; the Québécois are an ethnic and linguistic one. The separatists deny and the federalists affirm the possibility of the inclusion of an ethnic nationality in a political one.

AMERICAN INFLUENCE

English Canada, moreover, like French Canada, is dominated—“colonized” is the leftist term—by American capital and indeed by popular American culture. This the two have in common. But French language and culture still form a barrier to the process, although the strength of that obstacle is probably exaggerated. English Canada is almost completely open to American penetration, by common language, a common social disposition, a common popular culture, a tradition of half a century of good neighborliness and continental exchange.

The French Canadian may be forgiven in seeing in English Canada no ally in his attempt to resist—or at least transform to his own purposes—American capitalism and American culture. Two of the principal voices of English Canada, Donald Creighton and George Grant, have pessimistically written in historical and philosophical terms of the doubtful possibility that Canada can escape absorption by American technology and American culture.

Even the staunchest of Canadian nationalists is bound to respect such voices. But, quite apart from the recent new direction of the American economic policy, there is reason to think (as the growth of Canadian economic nationalism since 1963 reveals) that Canada, at her present levels of economic performance and expectation, cannot survive the present (not to mention a greater degree of) American ownership and control of her economy. This has been the message of Walter Gordon since he became Finance Minister of Canada in 1963. He now has wide popular support, ranging from the New Democratic party through the Liberal to the Conservative party, despite strong and numerous continentalist elements in all three. The fundamental reason for the growth of economic nationalism is simple and clear.

In the mere drift and weight of American economic policy, Canada is only a hinterland supplying raw materials and power to the American economy, selling the United States no more in the way of finished goods and services than Canadian laws and policy insist on.

Remove the latter, and Canada would become an economic hinterland pure and simple. Canada is, however, a land of considerable economic development and sophistication, and must become more so if she is to maintain her population at standards of life at all comparable with those of the United States. Canada must therefore seek out and pursue economic policies as little continentalist and as nationalist as possible.

It is, of course, in a national economic policy that the political nationality of Canada has heretofore flourished and in which Quebec and English Canada have largely found their partnership. The growth of economic nationalism may well be, therefore, the ground on which it will be possible to reconcile the differences of French and English Canada, a process in which both the separatists of the former and the continentalists of the latter will be confounded. That President Richard Nixon and Secretary of the Treasury John Connally should be the *dei ex machina* of such a *dénouement* is no doubt depressing for Canadian nationalists, but men so beset must welcome such allies as chance provides.

CANADA AND THE WORLD

(Continued from page 197)

Union and Canada are undoubtedly friendlier as a result of this visit and Premier Aleksei Kosygin's return journey in October of the same year, but the political results are unlikely to be spectacular. Trudeau went, as he said, on Canada's business, and not as a stalking horse for the United States; the days of the meddling middle power are ended, in this respect at least. Technological exchanges with the Soviet Union and possible trade benefits were the probable immediate objects. If the Canadian trip could make a contribution to an East-West *détente*, so much the better.

Trudeau's association with the Soviet rulers was, however, repugnant to a substantial proportion of Canada's immigrant community. Criticism greeted some aspects of his Soviet trip, while Kosygin's return visit forced the most massive security precautions in Canadian history. A visit from Yugoslav President Tito also caused discontent. The government's efforts at securing a rapprochement with East Europe may have been rational, but they have not, so far, proved popular.

West Europe has always been closer to the center of Canadian foreign policy. One of the causes of

the imbalance in Canadian external relations, as perceived by the government, has been West Europe's retreat from North America. West Europe's historical importance underlines its international significance: it is necessary to restore the balance, if not precisely to recreate a special association like the vanishing Commonwealth.

European unity would appear to work to the exclusion of Canada; to many, it seems that Europe has written off Canada as a possible partner. Julien's dream has not come appreciably closer to fulfillment. If, however, European unity is less close than has been predicted, there may yet be room for maneuver, so necessary in view of the government's preoccupation with creating alternatives to total dependence on the United States. No single sentence of the government's policy statement reveals this quandary more than one describing Canada's "continuing search for countervailing factors to offset the pressure of its complex involvement with the United States."

The immediate consequences of this policy dictate continuing close attention to Europe. For this reason, further Canadian withdrawal from Europe is unlikely; rather, continuing Canadian interest in European security is affirmed—within NATO: "The Canadian Government has rejected any suggestion that Canada assume a non-aligned or neutral role in the world." Although the government assures worried allies that it will observe its obligations under NATO "in a responsible manner," it is clear that the political associations of NATO rather than its military commitments are the important associations for Canada. As with regard to East Europe, it may be questioned whether the government could go much further than it has without incurring unacceptable domestic political risks. The Canadian government has only the option of trying to preserve as much of the past freedom of access as it can, hoping that the European community will not become an indifferent monolith where Canadian interests are concerned. Should that happen, the future of "the major Canadian objectives of maintaining independence and a distinct identity" would be bleak indeed.

Outside Europe, Canada has few advantages to derive from external contact. Relations with the third world may help Canadians' definition of their own self-image, and may ultimately be of use in a long-term view of security, but they will not help Canada with her immediate concerns of preserving national unity and national independence.

With the third world in relative limbo, the United Nations has passed into a state of suspended animation. The Canadian government professes its intention of helping to build a more effective United Nations, but it concludes its policy summary on the United Nations with the words that "Canada will continue to work" for the ends of the United Nations.

Canada will support, as far as she reasonably can, United Nations projects and resolutions for greater social justice around the world, but one has the impression that the pursuit of wordy United Nations objectives will not have first priority in Ottawa.

Observers abroad may not find much new in the Canadian government's policies relating to the external, non-North American world.

It is the approach that is new. The government's reexamination of foreign policy, its subsequent publication of its modest policy aims, and its general reasons for adopting these aims are an expression of faith in the existence of an informed and interested public, and in the latter's ability to digest and criticize foreign policy. Except for Anglo-Canadian and Canadian-American relations, foreign policy has seldom interested Canadians for very long, and Trudeau's largely unread policy statements are a very long leap in the dark. Under the stuffing of official rhetoric, however, there is cause for optimism: the intention, at least, is honest and the profession revealing. There is no evidence that the government's policy is very different from what it says it is.

What it says is gloomy enough. Canadian foreign policy reacts to internal pressures and to American pressures. Often, in this federalized country, the two are the same. The shadow of the United States dominates the relations of Canada with "the world" in the way that Great Britain dominated Canadian diplomacy in the 1910's. The relationship is friendly; but overwhelming enough to lead Canada to seek relief in occasional liaisons elsewhere. The success or failure of these contacts will define the success or failure of Trudeau's foreign policy.

THE CANADIAN ECONOMY

(Continued from page 208)

pirically barren nominal variable. Then it would be important to ask, who does the "naming" and why? To attempt an answer we would have to pluck our model from the deterministic and/or perfectly "rational" nexus within which we have treated it hypothetically and subject it to the sometimes confusing and frustrating battering of political, historical and sociological analysis.

This is not the place, of course, to attempt to structure the questions that would be involved in such an analysis. What we have done, necessarily in a somewhat discursive fashion, is to hint at the possible questions to which such an analysis could be articulated. For example, it has been suggested, tentatively, that what seems most to distinguish Canada from other

economic systems are those features that link Canada to the United States economic system. Not only does the United States affect Canadian economic system performance, but the influence of the "colossus of the south" also appears in the economic goals of the Canadian economy, some of which obviously overlap with broader social system goals. Thus we end with an assumption and a question, both posed by Gilles Paquet in his analysis of Canadian economic development:

In summary, we can rely on the basic economic forces and the natural inertia of the Canadian people to effect [the] shift toward continental unity. The timing and the form of such integration will depend basically on how long the people of Canada will continue to buy this good called "nationality" and what price they are willing to pay for it, and on the type of social aggregation which will be dominant, these questions being obviously interrelated.³⁴

CANADIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

(Continued from page 202)

the Commons' seats. The Pearson government had directed much of its attention to the problem of English-French relations in Canada and to the emerging new nationalism which Quebec's "Quiet Revolution" had seemed to be generating in the early 1960's. The government had established a Royal Commission to investigate bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and had been accused by some critics of "catering to Quebec."

Nevertheless, when the Liberals chose a new party leader in 1967 (Pearson retired voluntarily), they continued the alternation of French and English, which had begun with Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and selected Pierre Elliott Trudeau. The Conservatives also changed leaders in 1967, but Diefenbaker left rather more reluctantly. His replacement was the Premier of Nova Scotia, Robert Stanfield, whose image of stalwart experience seemed no match for that of Trudeau—allegedly dynamic and youthful—in the election of 1968. "Trudeaumania" returned the Liberal party to the 45 per cent of the popular vote it regularly expected in the King-St. Laurent years. The Conservatives obtained around 31 per cent of the vote and the NDP around 17 per cent. The Cr ditistes and Social Credit together obtained some 5 per cent of the vote and only the Quebec party obtained seats in the Commons. In 1971, the Cr ditistes returned to the national Social Credit party (having effectively *become* the national party).

THE ELECTIONS OF 1972

As the parties prepare for a general election, expected in the summer or fall of 1972, the party system seems from one point of view to be quite stable and from another to be in a remarkable condition of chaos. Few commentators believe that the Liberals will lose

³⁴ "Some Views on the Pattern of Canadian Economic Development," in Brewis (ed.), *Growth and the Canadian Economy* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1968), p. 64.

the coming election, although all point to discontent in Quebec and in the western provinces over unemployment and economic decline as possible sources of Liberal loss. Stanfield still does not appear to be a match for Trudeau; the minor parties are in no position to challenge for office. The Social Credit group seems in some degree of disarray and must depend on strength in Quebec to oppose a French Canadian Prime Minister. The NDP in their 1971 leadership change opted for experience rather than innovation and are thus unlikely to improve their position to any great degree, if leadership is a variable of importance. The smart money predicts no major change.

However, at the provincial level, a somewhat different situation prevails. Since 1968, all but three of the provinces have changed partisan control of their governments. In Quebec, the nationalists have managed to unite to a greater degree than ever in the province's history, and while the Liberals won a substantial victory in the 1970 election, 23 per cent of the population of Quebec voted for a party whose aim is to remove Quebec from Confederation. The Atlantic provinces remain two-party systems but Prince Edward Island is the only one whose government has not changed since 1968. Newfoundland in a sense has *become* a two-party system by electing its first Conservative government (albeit by a very narrow margin) since it entered Confederation in 1949. Ontario is still dominated by the Conservative party, with the Liberals and New Democrats splitting equally a little over half the popular vote.

When one crosses the border into Manitoba, however, the chaos of the party system is evident. Until 1969, Manitoba had a Conservative government and a Liberal Opposition; it now has a New Democratic government and a Conservative Opposition. Saskatchewan has elected the NDP as its governing party once again, and has returned the Liberals to opposition. Alberta, which had a Social Credit administration since 1935, last year elected a Conservative government—the first in the province's history. British Columbia remains the last Sacred stronghold at the provincial level; the Opposition is the NDP.

The multiplicity of parties is sometimes taken as one example of the regional diversity of the Canadian political system. That regionalism underlies all discussions of the major political issues in Canada today. Constitutional revision, western discontent among primary producers, the place of Quebec in Confederation, the possible union of the Maritime provinces—all these have a regional basis. Even the issue of economic development and social welfare is generally seen in regional or ethnic terms.

The older Canadian parties—the Liberals and Conservatives—seem content to maintain this organization of political life. As long as the mass in each sub-unit believes that it has more in common with its own

sub-unit's elite than with the mass in other sub-units, the position of all elites is secure. If a New Democrat were asked to state the major political question of the day, however, he would probably respond that it involves the de-emphasis of regional and ethnic divisions and the stressing of class economic interests, because the impact of the multi-national corporation on Canadian social and economic life is too great to allow us to build "socialism in one province."

BOOKS CONCLUDED

(Continued from page 209)

This economic gain is due, in part, to the minimal expenditures needed for military purposes. Can economic and commercial growth alone, without military support, serve to establish Japan as a world power?

This is the dilemma which John K. Emmerson, an observer and participant in U.S.-Japanese affairs since the 1930's, sees as confronting Japan. But considering other complexities in Asian struggles for regional or world power status, the dilemma concerns the United States as well.

W.F.B.

WORD POLITICS: VERBAL STRATEGY AMONG THE SUPERPOWERS. BY THOMAS M. FRANCK AND EDWARD WEISBAND. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 176 pages and index, \$5.95.)

The authors attempt to prove "that the ways we choose to conceptualize our national and regional rights and privileges in the Western Hemisphere are precisely indistinguishable from those most recently given prominence by the Soviet Union in the Brezhnev Doctrine." Thus we have provided the Soviets with a "logical and legally impeccable cover" for the ravishment of Czechoslovakia at least in the war of words carried on between the United States and Russia. The authors admit that while our actions have not been as reprehensible as those of the Russians—our recent actions in the Dominican Republic and against Cuba in 1962 and Guatemala in 1954 are not as reprehensible as Russian force in Hungary and Prague—we have nonetheless afforded the Soviets the opportunity to use the same type of propaganda that we used to justify our actions; thus we have given them a strategic advantage that we can ill-afford.

Using the above examples, Franck and Weisband trace recent diplomatic history; what has been said and done or left undone and how each country has benefited strategically.

This is a short, well-written book with an interesting and provocative theme.

O.E.S.

AT THE INTERFACE

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for independent action are severely limited. American investment, which already stands at over \$50 billion, continues to pour in at the rate of \$3 million a day, and American penetration of the economy makes Canada highly susceptible to domestic changes within the United States.¹⁶ This penetration is not decreasing but increasing.¹⁷

Some have posed the choice for Canada rather starkly: a continued drift toward American domination of the economy and the polity through "continentalism," or a radical reorientation of Canada's life through a "Canadian Castro" who would use fundamental socialism as a starting point, expropriate all American property, and steer Canada toward international neutrality.¹⁸ The second alternative probably could be accomplished, but at great cost. As with any goal of any political system, there are pay-offs and costs as well as tradeoffs with other goals. Canada could opt for such a radical independent stance if her leaders were willing to pay the price in terms of economic decline. Being a highly developed society geared to industrialization and urbanized life, the costs would be comparably greater than if Canada belonged to the Third World, with socio-economic profiles to match.

It boils down to this, how far would the Canadians be willing to go to increase their independence vis-à-vis the United States. Severing ties and perhaps opening the country to unlimited migration (from Latin America, the Caribbean or Asia) would indeed thrust Canada into a new phase and free her from living in the American shadow. But would it be worth it? As David Baldwin has so perceptively observed:

It is up to Canadians to decide whether the various remedies are worse than the disease. One can get rid of a blemish on the finger by amputating the arm, but few people try it.¹⁹

The Canadian political system may be moving toward greater economic and political independence with regard to the United States and toward a reassessment of the desirability of American penetration

¹⁶ As Newman has written, "The cliché is that when the American economy catches a cold we sneeze; the fact is that we develop pneumonia," "The Thawing of Canada," pp. 222-223.

¹⁷ It is true, as Stephen Randall has pointed out, that in the decade of the 1960's, only 874 manufacturing plants out of 14,201 that were established were foreign controlled but these tended to be by far and away the largest in terms of capitalization plus total number of workers employed. See Stephen Randall, "Canada's Economic 'Nashionalists'," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. IX, No. 2 (Summer, 1971), pp. 229-234.

¹⁸ Davis, "Canadian Society," p. 25.

¹⁹ Baldwin, "Canadian-American Relations," p. 150.

of the economy and polity. But this is not to say that Canada's leaders are unaware, almost painfully so, of the parameters which circumscribe their possible courses of action. It may well be that Canada will try to wrench free from the embrace of the United States in the years ahead, but for the present, the odds seem overwhelmingly against it. In the long run, at least, the changes in the relationship will probably turn out to be matters of degree rather than kind.

CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

(Continued from page 180)

After World War II, Canada found that she had a more puzzling role to play. Despite her intent to act the part of an independent state more and more, she was expected by her powerful neighbor to follow and observe the shifting patterns of United States policy toward China or Cuba. Canada was urged also to integrate her forces within a defense scheme in which she was the very junior partner and which she had to recognize would not look very different without her. Canada did take a number of important foreign policy initiatives separate from the United States, as for example with respect to peace-keeping in the United Nations, but the prevailing feeling in Canada, to employ one of the popular metaphors, was of a little boy trying to follow a slightly distracted older brother running ahead of him.

Postwar political cooperation between the United States and Canada was not universally smooth. In Canada, there was mounting conviction that the United States abandoned the notion of partnership if its own economic interests were threatened. Changes in procurement policies which led to cancellations in Canada of the Avro Arrow fighter plane and orders for uranium left deep scars. In the United States, early recognition by Canada of mainland China and the establishment of relations with Cuba brought grumbles about disloyalty and bad faith. The issue of American nuclear missiles stationed on Canadian soil became an irritant on the United States doorstep as it was elsewhere in the world.

Ironically, the decline in American self-confidence during the Vietnam war seemed to open new options for Canada. Above all, Canada was able now to deal with a country much less likely to preach and draw morals than she had been for a full century. By the mid-1960's, it had become very difficult indeed for American leaders to speak piously about either foreign or domestic policy while it was being torn apart by dissent over these very policies. It is significant that during the last few years while the United States foreign aid effort has faltered, while moves toward rapprochement with the East have proceeded haltingly, and while the United States armed forces have been damaged by scandal, drugs and low morale, con-

trasting developments have taken place in Canada. The Canadian International Development Agency began to hit its stride during this period; Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau visited Moscow well in advance of President Richard Nixon; and the Canadian forces began to take on imaginative new paramilitary tasks, including the provision of developmental assistance in the north. Such innovations have allowed Canadians to hold their heads high in relations with Americans. The leadership of a debonair, urbane, even "swinging" Prime Minister has added to the new and heady Canadian mood.

Wisely, the United States has kept clear of Canada's most intractable internal problem—how to adapt the federal structure to new demands for autonomy from the regions and particularly from the Province of Quebec. To some extent, the French-Canadian question may have kept anti-Americanism below what it might otherwise have been in Canada. Certainly the French Canadians themselves have seldom taken part in the cries against American cultural or economic imperialism which have emanated from parts of English Canada, and they have even suggested that this issue is a red herring; to the French Canadians the domination seems nearer home. Of course, if the federal-provincial crisis in Canada should conclude with such a drastic result as the secession of Quebec from Confederation, there is little doubt that the United States would inevitably become involved in Canadian affairs as never before.

III

The cultural relations of Canada and the United States have tended to reflect the economic and political links. As trade and investment diminished from Great Britain and increased from the United States, ideas, values and social and cultural institutions moved with them. The vehicles were books, magazines, newspapers, radio, television, vacationers, migrants, returning students, and professional bodies such as trade unions and learned societies. As with the other relationships, major changes in kind and degree have occurred in recent years. For generations the most prominent cultural flows between the two countries consisted of products of the arts and mass media like Hollywood movies and *Time* magazine flowing northward and passing on the way south talented Canadian scholars, artists, athletes and entrepreneurs like John Kenneth Galbraith, Saul Bellow, S.I. Hayakawa, Cyrus Eaton and the New York Rangers hockey team. More than any comparable immigrants to an alien land, Canadians have blended chameleon-like into the countryside.

Recent shifts in the flows have not been absolute, but they have led to a closer balance in some categories. Canadian products still do not compete prominently in many American cultural markets, but

Canadian ballet companies are now familiar fare across the United States, some Canadian movies do make money throughout the world, the small literary magazine has found its last bastion in Canada, and the remarkable recent multiplication and growth of Canadian universities has led for the first time to a net outward movement of young scholars from the United States.

There has been a modest movement for cultural autonomy in Canada analogous to economic nationalism, and there have been proposals for protection of the arts, humanities and mass media. One aspect of this movement has been an unwillingness among Canadian nationalists to recognize that the "American" culture they wish to exclude is in large part merely the present-day culture to be found around the world. When they propose to protect their fellow citizens from (i.e. prevent them from obtaining) music, films or publications from the south, they are really calling for a return to another age. One can only hope for Canada, as well as for the state of Canadian-American relations, that on the cultural front any actions taken will be positive, designed to strengthen Canada's culture so that she may compete successfully and unprotected in the world market place, and not negative, designed to perpetuate sickly and second-rate products.

One must conclude an essay on this type by speculating about what Canadian-American relations will look like in the foreseeable future. It seems reasonable to suggest that more of the auguries are favorable than unfavorable at the moment. The economies of both nations should generally remain prosperous and complementary, with the continued shift in Canadian bargaining power visible in such products as power and water. Politically, it is hard to predict any dramatic new experiments with unification; too many politicians have ended their careers on these rocks before. What is more likely is the creation in the future of more bodies like the Joint Commission, perhaps with a more limited commission but greater authority to deal with such social and economic problems as environmental protection and regional development. In the cultural and psychic arena, Canada's growing self-confidence combined with America's newfound humility may bring on a more relaxed era of relations among equals. There are already encouraging new signs in the United States of mounting interest in Canadian affairs. A worsening of the situation in French Canada or a major depression could, of course, change this forecast entirely.

As one looks around the world there are few borders over which as good relations should exist as that between the United States and Canada. After more than a century it seems fair to predict that this expectation may now be fulfilled.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of February, 1972, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Disarmament

- Feb. 4—In Vienna, the 6th round of SALT talks between the United States and the Soviet Union recesses until March 28. Some progress is reported toward a treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missiles.
- Feb. 29—The 1972 session of the Geneva disarmament conference opens.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

- Feb. 8—Terms of a new trade agreement worked out last week between member countries of the E.E.C. and the United States are accepted by the members of the E.E.C. The agreement provides for E.E.C. concessions on United States wheat and citrus exports and for worldwide trade negotiations in 1973.
- Feb. 18—Sources from E.E.C. countries say that E.E.C. monetary experts have agreed that member countries' currencies can move $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent above and below newly defined "central rates" against the dollar.

Middle East Crisis

- Feb. 2—The Israeli government accepts a U.S. proposal to begin negotiations with Egypt aimed at reopening the Suez Canal.
- Feb. 20—United Nations mediator Gunnar Jarring finishes 2 days of exploratory talks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Murad Ghaleb, in his first visit to Cairo in nearly 3 years.
- Feb. 25—Premier Saeb Salam of Lebanon reports that Israeli planes, troops and tanks staged reprisal raids in Lebanon today for what Israeli reports say were guerrilla ambushes in Israel.
- According to Lufthansa airline officials, the company paid \$5 million in ransom Feb. 23 to a group identified as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to release a Lufthansa jumbo jet which had been hijacked to Aden with its crew and passengers.
- Feb. 28—The Israeli army command reports that Israeli forces withdrew today after 4 days of operation in Lebanon. The U.N. Security Council passes a resolution calling for immediate withdrawal from Lebanon of Israeli forces.

Monetary Crisis

- Feb. 2—The heaviest speculative flurry since currencies were realigned in December, 1971, causes the price of gold to rise to \$49.50 an ounce compared with the official price of \$35 an ounce.

United Nations

- Feb. 3—U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim asks for tangible results as 5 draft resolutions dealing with some of Africa's most serious political problems are put on the Security Council's agenda in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Feb. 6—A Security Council resolution condemning the terms of the British-Rhodesian independence settlement is vetoed by Great Britain.
- Feb. 22—The United Nations, through Paul Marc Henry, special assistant to U.N. Secretary General Waldheim, asks the U.S. to provide a large but unspecified share of the \$627 million required for relief in Bangladesh this year.

War in Indochina

(See also *Cambodia*)

- Feb. 1—The U.S. command reports 2 more air strikes against North Vietnam, the 6th and 7th raids in the last 2 days; Navy and Air Force fighter-bombers fly 19 combat missions in South Vietnam.
- Feb. 2—South Vietnamese military spokesmen report that 3,000 South Vietnamese troops are pursuing 400 enemy soldiers across the Cambodian border.
- Feb. 3—The Vietcong delegates to the Paris peace talks present a revised version of their 7-point peace plan first presented last July. Xuan Thuy, the North Vietnamese delegate, calls U.S. President Richard Nixon's 8-point peace plan of January 25 "unacceptable."
- Feb. 11—The U.S. command reports that its planes flew 100 missions today in South Vietnam.
- Feb. 12—The most intense U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam base areas along the Lao-tian-South Vietnamese border enters its 4th day. The raids are the heaviest since September, 1970.
- Feb. 15—The 24-hour cease-fire proclaimed by South Vietnam and the U.S. for Tet, the lunar new year, ends; U.S. B-52 bombers resume their attacks in South Vietnam.
- The U.S. command reports that 131,200 American troops are still in Vietnam.
- Feb. 17—U.S. sources report that more than 100

American planes have finished a 29-hour succession of attacks on North Vietnamese installations in and north of the demilitarized zone.

Feb. 18—Fighter-bombers of the U.S. command launch about 150 raids on enemy targets in South Vietnam, along the Laotian border.

Feb. 20—South Vietnamese military sources report that enemy troops staged 65 attacks in South Vietnam over the weekend.

Feb. 23—Military sources report North Vietnamese counterattacks against Laotian positions in the Plaine des Jarres.

Feb. 25—The U.S. command says that 21 Americans have been wounded in an engagement with the North Vietnamese 42 miles east of Saigon.

Feb. 26—South Vietnamese sources say that 4,000 South Vietnamese soldiers are crossing the border into Cambodia in an attempt to prevent a North Vietnamese attack in the Mekong Delta area.

ARGENTINA

Feb. 2—The official index reports that the cost of living rose 11.3 per cent in January.

Feb. 19—The Foreign Ministry announces that the People's Republic of China has been recognized as "the only legal government in China," but notes that this does not imply the suspending of all ties with the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan.

Feb. 22—The government orders a ban on all foreign exchange trading "until further notice."

Feb. 23—The government devalues the peso 9.2 per cent.

AUSTRALIA

Feb. 7—Indonesian President Suharto is honored at a parliamentary lunch. He is the first Indonesian head of state to visit Australia.

BANGLADESH

Feb. 1—Violence ends after 3 days of fighting between Bengalis and the Biharis (non-Bengalis) in Dacca.

Feb. 4—Great Britain recognizes the government of Bangladesh; 9 nations follow suit. Twenty-nine nations have recognized Bangladesh, but the U.S., China and France have not. The government reveals that it has asked to be admitted to the Commonwealth.

Feb. 15—The government reveals it is working out details of an \$8-million trade agreement with Poland.

Sheik Mujibur Rahman says he favors an internationally arranged population exchange with Pakistan. The non-Bengalis who would prefer to leave Bangladesh are estimated by Mujib at 750,000.

Feb. 29—Sheik Mujibur flies to Moscow for a 5-day visit "of goodwill and gratitude."

CAMBODIA

Feb. 10—After an emergency Cabinet meeting, the government issues a communiqué declaring that it reserves the right to attack Communist troops occupying Angkor Wat and Angkor Thom; the Communists have occupied these temples for 21 months.

CANADA

Feb. 15—Statistics Canada reports that Canada's trade surplus dropped to \$5.3 million in January, compared to \$266.7 million in January, 1971.

CHILE

Feb. 9—In a document issued by party leaders, the governing Popular Unity coalition admits a need for broader popular support for the "process of revolutionary transformation."

Feb. 17—U.S. officials in Washington report that Chile has defaulted on loan payments to the Export-Import bank; Chile is also reported in arrears on loan payments to the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Feb. 19—Congress votes to prohibit President Salvador Allende Gossens from seizing certain kinds of private property without specific congressional authorization.

Feb. 25—Allende announces that the government will pay more than \$84 million to a subsidiary of Kennecott Copper Corporation as an installment in the debt it owes Kennecott for its share of the El Tiente copper mine. The total debt is \$92,743,000.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (Communist)

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 8—U.S. State Department officials reveal that China has recently received 2 long-range jet passenger planes from the U.S.S.R. as part of a trade agreement negotiated in 1970. China is expected to open European air service this year.

Feb. 14—Some dozen books banned during the period of the Cultural Revolution go on sale again in Peking.

Feb. 17—It is reported from Hong Kong that the Chinese press is giving meager coverage to the coming visit of U.S. President Richard Nixon to China.

Feb. 21—President Nixon arrives in Peking and is welcomed by Premier Chou En-lai.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung meets with President Nixon in what appears to be a surprise change of plans. The 2 leaders talk for about an hour.

Feb. 24—A Peking broadcast reveals that Tung Pi-wu has been named Acting Chief of State; he has been 1 of 2 Deputy Chiefs of State. Liu Shao-chi was Chief of State until he was deposed during the Cultural Revolution.

Feb. 28—President Nixon leaves China for the U.S. after a week-long visit which included 15 hours of conferences with Chou En-lai.

CHINA, REPUBLIC OF (Nationalist)

Feb. 21—The Assembly declares that U.S. President Richard Nixon's visit to Peking will "deeply and greatly hurt" the interests of the Republic of China.

CONGO REPUBLIC (Brazzaville)

Feb. 22—President Marien Ngouabi regains control of the government after the failure of an attempted coup. Paratroop Lieutenant Ange Diawara is identified as coup leader; apparently he has escaped.

CYPRUS

(See also *Greece*)

Feb. 12—Government sources report that Archbishop Makarios, President, has turned down an undisclosed Greek demand; the President has reportedly described the Greek request as "a completely unacceptable and humiliating ultimatum."

Feb. 16—It is reported from Nicosia that the Greek Ambassador to Nicosia has returned to Athens to take a new post as Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

ECUADOR

Feb. 15—President José Maria Velasco Ibarra is arrested and flown to Panama; General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara, commander in chief of the army, names a military junta with himself as President. The planned June 4 presidential elections are canceled and the constitution of 1945, drafted by leftists, is reinstated.

Feb. 16—The junta proclaims a "revolutionary and nationalist" government, imposes censorship, closes schools, and puts public transport under the armed forces.

FINLAND

Nov. 18—Government officials reveal that customs duties on imported goods from all nations outside the European Free Trade Area and the U.S.S.R. are being raised 2 to 5 per cent. The raise will affect about one-third of Finland's imports.

FRANCE

Feb. 15—On nationwide television, Premier Jacques Chaban-Delmas denies charges that he has evaded taxes for 4 years and that he has concealed his wealth. He accuses his critics of "political maneuvers."

Feb. 16—Socialists, Communists and major labor unions demand street demonstrations for "fiscal

justice"; the Premier's denial of charges of fraud is received without enthusiasm.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Feb. 22—The government declares that it will grant visiting privileges to West Berliners in East Germany for 2 1-week periods, at Easter and at Whitsunday. West Berliners were last allowed to visit East Germany in the spring of 1966.

GREECE

(See also *Cyprus*; *U.S.*, *For. Pol.*)

Feb. 19—An authoritative source in Athens declares that the new Greek ambassador to Cyprus will not assume his post "until relations between Athens and Nicosia are cleared up."

The Deputy Foreign Minister, Christian Xanthopoulos-Palamas, tells newsmen that "Relations between Athens and Nicosia concern the Greek national family. . . . Greece tolerates no foreign intervention in this affair. This declaration is addressed also to our friends—to them more so than to others." The remark is said to be directed at the U.S. Ambassador, who pressed Greek leaders to promise to avoid violence in Cyprus. On February 9, the Greek government asked Cypriote President Makarios to agree to the formation of a "national unity" government—in other words to resign.

INDIA

(See also *Pakistan*)

Feb. 7—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Sheik Mujibur Rahman, Prime Minister of Bangladesh, conclude 2 days of talks in Calcutta.

Feb. 12—Mrs. Gandhi says India's foreign policy is based on nonalignment and that she would welcome a dialogue with the U.S.

Feb. 19—In a letter to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, the Indian government declares that it is ready to open direct peace talks with Pakistan "at any time, at any level, and without any preconditions."

INDONESIA

(See *Australia*)

IRAQ

Feb. 17—At the close of a week-long Iraqi visit to Moscow, a joint communiqué is issued containing promises of more economic and military aid from the U.S.S.R. and an agreement to develop ties at the party level.

IRELAND

(See also *United Kingdom*)

Feb. 2—During a national day of mourning for the

13 people killed by British soldiers in Northern Ireland last month, a crowd burns the British Embassy in Dublin.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl., Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 6—Israeli officials reveal that an agreement has been reached in Paris to cancel Israel's 5-year-old order for the 50 *Mirage* jets which President Charles de Gaulle refused to deliver at the outbreak of the 1967 war. Israel is to accept some \$75 million for the aircraft.

Feb. 22—Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir pledges that the Air Force will receive a sizable increase in equipment according to plans in the record almost \$4-billion budget. Defense spending is about one-third of the total.

ITALY

Feb. 16—The executive of the Christian Democratic party asks Giulio Andreotti to try to form a single-party minority government after his 2d effort to form a coalition government fails.

Feb. 17—Premier Giulio Andreotti forms the 33d Cabinet since World War II, composed exclusively of Christian Democrats.

Feb. 26—Andreotti's Cabinet resigns after the Senate rejects a motion of confidence.

Feb. 28—President Giovanni Leone dissolves Parliament. Premier Andreotti will remain in office in a caretaker role until new elections take place in May, 1972.

JAPAN

Feb. 11—The Foreign Office discloses that 2 diplomats have been sent to Hanoi in Japan's first official mission to North Vietnam.

Feb. 24—State Department sources in Washington confirm the fact that Japan rejected U.S. efforts to persuade her not to send an official delegation to Hanoi.

LEBANON

(See *Intl., Middle East Crisis*)

LIBYA

Feb. 23—A high-level group representing the revolutionary-nationalist government leaves Cairo for a 5-day visit to the U.S.S.R. The delegation has been conferring with Egyptian government representatives in Cairo.

MOROCCO

Feb. 17—Speaking on radio and television, King Hassan II announces that a referendum on a new constitution (the 3d in 9 years) will be held March

1. In the new constitution, governmental and parliamentary powers would be extended, and the King's power to rule by decree would be somewhat restricted.

Feb. 18—The Independence party and the leftist National Union of Popular Forces—the 2 major parties—express "astonishment" at the King's announcement; they declare that the King's proposals do not meet the "needs of the moment," because the King retains too much power.

NEW ZEALAND

Feb. 2—John Ross Marshall is chosen as Prime Minister by the governing National party to succeed resigning Sir Keith Holyoake.

PAKISTAN

(See also *Bangladesh; India*)

Feb. 1—In China, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto confers with China's Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Feb. 2—After Bhutto's 3-day state visit to China, a joint communiqué warns India to withdraw her troops from East Pakistan; it is reported that China has pledged more economic aid and possibly military aid.

Feb. 5—International relief officials report that because of the December war there are at least half a million West Pakistani refugees along the border with India.

Feb. 14—Bhutto announces plans to meet with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh.

Feb. 27—In Peshawar, in the North-west Frontier Province, thousands of Pathans demonstrate to support their request for greater self-government and their demand that the government lift martial law. The rally was called by Khan Abdul Wali Khan, the leader of the National Awami party, which is predominantly Pathan.

QATAR

Feb. 22—A palace coup overthrows Sheikh Ahmed Bin Ali al-Thani; his cousin, Sheikh Khalifa Bin Hamad al-Thani, replaces him.

RHODESIA

Feb. 7—Lord Pearce, chairman of the British Commission on Rhodesian Public Opinion, declares that the Rhodesian government apparently is not keeping its promise to permit normal political activity during the commission's inquiry into public opinion on a peace settlement; he refers specifically to the detention of former Prime Minister Garfield Todd and his daughter.

Feb. 22—The Todds are released from prison and returned to their homes in a state of detention and isolation.

SUDAN

Feb. 26—The government and the South Sudan Liberation Front reach an agreement to end 16 years of civil war. The agreement providing for a new political, legal and administrative framework to protect regional aims ends a campaign against the Muslim Arab north on the part of southern secessionists for a separate state, "Azania."

SYRIA

Feb. 26—A Soviet-Syrian communiqué reveals that the U.S.S.R. has agreed to give Syria additional defensive weapons. The communiqué follows the visit to Syria of Soviet First Deputy Premier Kirill T. Mazurov.

UNION OF ARAB EMIRATES

Feb. 11—The sheikdom of Ras al Khaima becomes the 7th member of the union, which was founded December 2, 1971. The 40-member Assembly is to hold its first meeting tomorrow.

U.S.S.R.

Feb. 15—The official Soviet press agency *Tass* reports that the Soviet ambassadors in Washington and Athens have filed protests against what they charge is a U.S. decision to establish a naval base in Greece (see *U.S.*, *Foreign Policy*).

Feb. 17—*Pravda*, the Communist party daily, says that the reconciliation between the U.S. and China is a natural development so long as it is not aimed against Soviet interests.

Feb. 18—Major newspapers report a 1-day special conference of party and government leaders of the 15 republics in Moscow to consider the gravity of the agricultural crisis.

Feb. 21—A Soviet delegation arrives in Damascus on a 6-day visit.

Soviet Defense Minister Andrei A. Grechko leaves Cairo for Moscow after a 3-day visit to talk with Egypt's military leaders.

Feb. 24—At the 5th Japanese-Soviet joint economic committee meeting, the Soviet Union asks for Japanese financial aid to finance a \$3-billion trans-Siberian pipeline project; a partnership with Japanese enterprises is proposed by the U.S.S.R.

Feb. 25—The Defense Ministry asserts that Mainland China's military spending amounts to some one-third of her military budget, an all-time record.

Feb. 26—*Tass* announces that Luna 20 has completed a round trip to the moon; the re-entry capsule has been recovered.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

Feb. 9—Queen Elizabeth II arrives in Thailand at the beginning of a 6-week, 7-nation tour.

Feb. 11—In the House of Commons, the government announces that it has ordered industry to cut its use of electricity because of the national coal strike; a 3-day week will be instituted in most factories.

Feb. 14—Hundreds of thousands of workers are laid off and blackouts to conserve electrical power continue on a rotating basis.

Feb. 15—Officials estimate that 1.2 million Britons have been laid off as the coal strike continues.

Feb. 17—Voting 309 to 301, Commons narrowly approves Britain's entry into the European Economic Community (Common Market).

Feb. 19—Leaders of the coal miners union accept a proposed settlement of the coal strike.

Feb. 22—When a terrorist bomb explodes at Aldershot, 7 people are killed; the Irish Republican Army claims to have set the bomb.

Feb. 23—Parliament acts to invalidate a ruling of the High Court of Northern Ireland which declared invalid a regulation allowing army officers to force a crowd to disperse.

Feb. 25—Ending a 7-week strike, coal miners vote to accept a pay increase and return to work; 96 per cent of the striking miners favor the settlement, which calls for an average pay increase of nearly 20 per cent.

Northern Ireland

Feb. 6—In Newry, Northern Ireland, thousands stage a peaceful civil rights protest march against the British and Northern Ireland governments.

Feb. 25—Deputy Minister of Home Affairs John Taylor is shot and badly hurt; the I.R.A. claims responsibility.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

Feb. 8—Representative Luis Stokes (D., Ohio) is elected leader of the 13-member Congressional Black Caucus. He succeeds Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D., Mich.), in this capacity.

Federal District Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., orders the Alabama Department of Public Safety to recruit Negroes until the all-white state police force is 25 per cent black.

Feb. 14—On the first day of massive busing in Augusta, Georgia, officials say that 19,029 out of a total of 36,000 pupils failed to attend classes.

Feb. 15—Governor Reubin Askew of Florida says he will not veto a bill passed yesterday by the legislature placing an anti-busing referendum on the March 14 ballot.

Feb. 18—The Supreme Court of California declares capital punishment unconstitutional on the grounds that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

Foreign Policy

Feb. 5—*The New York Times* reports that, "according to well placed administration sources," the U.S. has agreed to sell Israel 42 F-4 Phantom and 90 A-4 Skyhawk jets over a 2- to 3-year period.

State Department officials announce agreement with Greece "on principle" for the provision of a "home port" in Greece for some units of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

Feb. 6—Llewellyn E. Thompson, twice U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, dies at age 67.

Feb. 11—Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Elliot L. Richardson and Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly F. Dobrynin announce an agreement to pool efforts against cancer, heart disease and environmental health problems.

Feb. 14—Ronald L. Ziegler, White House press secretary, says that President Nixon has directed that United States trade policy towards China be put on the same basis as trade policy towards the Soviet Union.

Feb. 17—President Nixon leaves for Peking, China.

Charles W. Bray 3d, State Department spokesman, says that the Soviet Union has agreed to reopen talks on settling its World War II lend-lease debt.

Feb. 21—President Nixon arrives in Peking, where he is greeted by Premier Chou En-lai and has a subsequent 1-hour meeting with Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Feb. 22—President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai engage in 4 hours of policy discussions.

Feb. 23—The President and the Premier have another 4 hours of private talks.

Feb. 24—Talks between Nixon and Chou En-lai continue.

Feb. 25—The major portion of the Nixon-Chou En-lai talks are concluded.

Officials of the Agency for International Development say that the agency is preparing to ship \$21-million worth of food grains to Bangladesh in the next 2 or 3 weeks.

Feb. 26—Accompanied by Premier Chou En-lai, President Nixon visits Hangchow and Shanghai.

Feb. 27—In a joint, 1,800-word communiqué, a gradual increase in Chinese-American contacts and exchanges is pledged by President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai, and the U.S. promises gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan.

Feb. 28—After a week-long visit to China that included 15 hours of formal talks with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, President Nixon returns to Washington.

Feb. 29—At a meeting with Congressional leaders President Nixon says that Mike Mansfield (Mont.) and Hugh Scott (Pa.), Democratic and Republican

leaders of the Senate, have been invited to visit China by Premier Chou En-lai.

Government

Feb. 3—Secretary of State William P. Rogers accuses Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D., Me.) of hampering a negotiated Vietnam settlement by rejecting the President's latest peace proposals before North Vietnam has formally done so.

Secretary Rogers diminishes the cuts in the State Department's intelligence branch from his previously proposed 33 per cent, to 13 per cent.

Feb. 7—President Nixon signs the much delayed \$2.75-billion foreign aid authorization act. He describes the act as a disappointment and a hindrance to his conduct of foreign affairs.

The President also signs the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the first serious reform of the process of financing federal elections since the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, which it repeals and replaces. The act limits a candidate's personal contribution to his own campaign to \$50,000 for the Presidency, \$35,000 for the Senate, \$25,000 for the House. Full reporting of both the sources and uses of campaign funds is required. The act limits a candidate's spending for all advertising media to \$50,000 or 10 cents for each person of voting age (whichever is larger), in a national, state or congressional election campaign. The law takes effect April 7.

Feb. 10—President Nixon reiterates that he favors local control of local schools and opposes busing for the purpose of racial balance. He says that he has ordered a study to determine whether a constitutional amendment or legislation is needed to thwart the trend of recent federal court decisions requiring extensive busing to achieve better racial balance.

Feb. 11—Dr. Bertram S. Brown, director of the National Institute of Mental Health, urges that penalties for the use of marijuana be lessened.

Feb. 15—Attorney General John N. Mitchell resigns to direct the reelection campaign of President Nixon. President Nixon nominates Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to succeed Mitchell.

Feb. 16—The Census Bureau reports that the number of children American women plan to bear has dropped so sharply from 1967 to 1971 that among younger women the nation seems to be approaching zero population growth.

Labor

Feb. 21—Longshoremen return to work on the West Coast docks after ratification of a new 18-month labor contract. The strike began July 1, 1971, and continued until Oct. 6, when the administration ob-

tained a Taft-Hartley injunction requiring a return to work for an 80-day cooling-off period. The injunction expired Dec. 25, 1971, and the West Coast longshoremen resumed their strike on Jan. 17, 1972.

Military

Feb. 2—Barry J. Shillito, logistics chief for the Department of Defense, says that the United States has removed 1.8 million tons of military equipment, valued at \$4.5 billion, from South Vietnam.

Feb. 8—Secretary of the Navy John G. Chafee says that the Naval Academy will continue to bar women but that the Navy will open its Reserve Officers Training Corps to them.

Feb. 11—Army National Guard officials say the Guard is 20,000 men below its authorized strength of 400,000 because of the declining possibility that young men will be drafted.

Politics

Feb. 2—Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D., Me.) says President Nixon's peace proposals are an attempt "to win at the conference table what we have not won and cannot win on the battlefield." His alternate peace proposal is to set a firm date for the withdrawal of United States forces in return for their safety and the release of American prisoners of war.

Feb. 7—H. R. Haldeman, of the White House Staff, says that critics of the President's latest plan for Vietnam peace are "consciously aiding and abetting the enemy of the United States."

Feb. 10—President Nixon says that "The responsibility for the enemy's failing to negotiate may have to be borne by those who encourage the enemy to wait until after the election."

Feb. 11—Representative Wilbur D. Mills (D., Ark.) formally announces that he is seeking the Democratic Presidential nomination.

Supreme Court

Feb. 22—In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court strikes down an Idaho law that gives preference to men over women as executors in administering estates. This is the first invalidation of a state law by the Court for reasons of sex discrimination.

Feb. 23—The Supreme Court rules that Senator Vance Hartke's (D., Ind.) apparent election victory in 1970 over former Representative Richard L. Roudebush must be subject to a recount in Indiana.

The Supreme Court rules that a landlord's failure to make repairs does not give a tenant the right to withhold rent. The tenant can sue in a separate action.

Feb. 24—The Court rules that a Jacksonville, Fla., vagrancy ordinance is unconstitutional because it does not specify what conduct was forbidden. The decision applies to many vague local vagrancy ordinances.

URUGUAY

Feb. 10—Unofficial returns show Juan M. Bordaberry the winner in the presidential election of November 28, 1971. Bordaberry was the candidate of the incumbent Colorado party.

YEMEN, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (South)

Feb. 22—The Aden radio reports that the government defeated an invading guerrilla force of some 2,000 yesterday.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 13—The national police remove almost 3,000 Vietnamese children from South Vietnam's largest orphanage, the Longthanh Orphans Village, whose Buddhist leaders have been suspected of using the orphans for political purposes.

Feb. 23—Lieutenant General Nguyen Chanh Thi is denied entrance to South Vietnam on his return from a 6-year exile in the U.S. The general was ousted as commander of Military Region I in northern South Vietnam in 1966; his removal sparked the Buddhist riots of 1966.

Feb. 24—Thieu issues a communiqué saying that he would welcome a conference of all Southeast Asian nations, including North Vietnam.

ZAIRE

Feb. 15—The Political Bureau of the ruling Popular Revolutionary Movement declares that all people of Zaire must adopt authentic African names and drop their baptismal names. The President has changed his name from Joseph Mobutu to Mobutu Sese Seko.

ZAMBIA

Feb. 1—In a telephone interview last night made public today, Finance Minister John Mwanakatwe declares he will not hesitate to tell businessmen to import from South Africa if that is the cheapest market; this marks a reversal of Zambia's policy of discouraging trade with white South Africa.

Feb. 3—President Kenneth D. Kaunda bans the 5-month-old United Progressive party, the opposition party, and orders the detention of 123 of its leaders without trial.

Feb. 25—At a news conference, Kaunda declares that he has named a 12-man commission to suggest ways to set up a 1-party state for Zambia.

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